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1. Linda L8  Tesar 
The Role of  Equity in International Capital Flows 
5.1.1  Introduction 
In 1980 the United States dominated the world's  financial markets, account- 
ing for more than 50 percent of the capitalized value of the world stock market. 
Only a small fraction of the U.S. equity portfolio was invested in foreign mar- 
kets; estimates of  the foreign equity holdings of  U.S. investors suggest that 
roughly 98 percent of the total equity portfolio was invested at home (Tesar 
and Werner 1995). To the extent that U.S. investors ventured into foreign mar- 
kets, they did so primarily to the familiar markets of Europe and Canada. Al- 
though most of the legal barriers to cross-border trading in foreign securities 
were dismantled with the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, the practical 
costs of transacting in foreign capital markets remained prohibitive. 
Rolling the clock forward seventeen years, the world has indeed become a 
different place. Fueled by  the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Eu- 
rope, Latin America, and Asia and the liberalization and expansion of markets 
in developing countries, cross-border equity investment has become an impor- 
tant channel for international diversification among industrialized countries 
and a conduit for capital flows from industrialized to developing countries. In 
1994, global investment in the equity of firms in developing countries reached 
$26 billion, accounting for nearly 20 percent of equity inflows worldwide (IMF 
1996). One in four equity transactions in the United States now involves for- 
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eign equity or a foreign buyer or seller, and roughly  12 percent of the U.S. 
portfolio is held in foreign stocks. 
This paper reviews recent developments in the globalization of equity mar- 
kets. Section 5.  l .2 begins by presenting some evidence on the growth in equity 
markets and the factors that help account for recent trends in cross-border eq- 
uity investment.’ On the supply side of global capital markets, the benefits of 
global diversification provide a significant incentive for investing across na- 
tional borders. In addition, there has been a general shift in the allocation of 
savings from traditional bank deposits toward investment in equity through 
mutual and pension funds. These institutionally managed funds have increas- 
ingly turned to international markets as a source of higher returns. On the de- 
mand side, the capital needs of developing countries and countries making the 
transition  from centrally  planned  to more market-based  economic systems 
have brought a large number of firms to the global equity market as a means 
of raising capital. The barriers between savers residing in one nation and firms 
demanding capital located in another nation have been declining over time as 
communications technology improves and the process of eliminating of capital 
controls continues. 
Section 5.1.3 takes a closer look at the volume and direction of cross-border 
equity flows in light of the recent growth in equity markets. Data on net equity 
flows suggest that there has been an increase in the net flow of equity invest- 
ment from industrialized to developing countries. However, 80 to 90 percent 
of global equity investment originates and is invested in the developed markets 
of Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan. From the perspective of in- 
vestors in industrialized countries, the majority of their portfolios are held in 
domestic equity, although the degree of home bias is eroding over time. Be- 
tween 1980 and 1996, the share of the U.S. equity portfolio invested in foreign 
stocks increased from 2 to 12  percent, though it still remains far from the “opti- 
mal” portfolio allocation suggested by basic portfolio theory. 
Section 5.1.4 turns to the behavior of U.S. investors in foreign equity mar- 
kets. Concerns have been raised about the risk of equity flows as a source of 
long-term external finance. Analysis of the determinants of U.S. portfolio allo- 
cation suggests that U.S. investors are primarily driven by signals about the 
local economy, increasing their portfolio holdings in markets when expected 
returns in that market are high. Global factors, such as swings in world interest 
rates, are not found to be significant in the allocation of the U.S. equity portfo- 
lio. This evidence suggests that equity inflows can be a reliable source of capi- 
tal as long as local market conditions are consistent with long-run growth and 
stability. 
1. Throughout, the term “equity investment” will refer to portfolio equity investment. For a 
discussion of  the issues related to foreign direct investment, see chapters 6.1 by Robert Lipsey and 
6.2 by  Robert Feenstra in this volume. 237  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 




















































































Source:  International  Finance  Corporation,  Emerging  Stock  Markets  Factbook  (Washington, 
D.C., 1996). 
Note: End-of-period values in millions of  U.S. dollars. 
5.1.2  The Growth in International Equity Markets 
Since 1990, world equity markets have grown at a phenomenal rate. Table 
5.1 shows the capitalized values of  the equity markets in Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the twelve largest emerging stock markets in 
terms of market capitalization at the end of 1996. Over the 1990-96 period the 
capitalized value of the global equity market nearly doubled, expanding from 
$9.4 to $20.2 trillion. In contrast, world economic activity over the same period 
grew by a mere 15.7 percent (IMF 1997). At the end of  1996 developed equity 
markets in Europe, Asia, and the United States accounted for over 90 percent 
of the global market, growing from $8.8 trillion in 1990 to $20 trillion in 1996. 
The share of  developed equity markets in the world total has declined over 
time, however, due to the even faster rate of growth of  equity markets in emerg- 
ing markets. This section examines some of  the factors that contributed to the 
expansion of global equity markets and the increase in cross-border equity in- 
vestment. 238  Linda L. Tesar 
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Fig. 5.1  Risk-return trade-off portfolio of U.S. and world 
indexes, 1985:02-90:12 
Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
Nore: Monthly returns are in U.S.  dollars. 
The Benefits of Global Diversification 
One obvious incentive for investing in foreign markets is the benefits of 
diversification across domestic and foreign securities. The potential benefits of 
diversification have been well known for decades. In a pair of articles written 
nearly three decades ago, Grubel (1968) and Levy and Samat (1970) demon- 
strated that the addition of foreign securities to a portfolio of domestic securi- 
ties provides substantial risk reduction due to the relatively low correlation 
between domestic and foreign asset returns. To illustrate this point, figure 5.1 
shows the trade-off in terms of risk and return of  holding an index of U.S. 
stocks and the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index over the 
1985-90  period. The data are monthly returns in U.S. dollars. An  investor 
holding a portfolio invested entirely in U.S. equities over this time period re- 
ceived a mean return of  1.27 percent (15.27 percent on an annualized basis) 
with a monthly standard deviation, or risk, of 5.09 percent, while the global 
portfolio earned a mean return of 1.59 percent (19.06 percent annualized) with 
4.98 percent risk. The “bullet” shape in figure 5.1 illustrates the risk and return 
of holding different combinations of the two assets. The figure makes it clear 
that an investor who is averse to risk could have obtained higher returns and 239  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Table 5.2  Monthly Returns in Developed Equity Markets (percent) 
Market  Annualized Mean"  Riskb  Sharpe Ratio" 
A. Sample Period: 1985:02-1989:12 
Canada  16.0  17.8  0.9 
France  37.1  27.0  1.4 
Germany  32.9  21.0  1.2 
Italy  35.3  28.0  1.3 
Japan  38.5  23.4  1.6 
United Kingdom  21.6  24.5  1.1 
United States  18.5  17.6  1.1 









B. Sample Period: 199O:Ol-1997:06 
8.3  13.6 
9.9  16.9 
10.9  17.8 
5.5  25.1 
0.2  26.8 
13.8  16.1 
16.4  11.9 









Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
Note: End-of-month total returns are in U.S. dollars. 
"The annualized mean is the monthly percentage change times twelve. 
bThe annualized standard deviation is the monthly standard deviation times the square root of 
twelve. 
The  Sharpe ratio is the annualized mean divided by the annualized standard deviation. 
borne less risk by  diversifying his portfolio away from U.S.  stocks into the 
global portfolio. 
Table 5.2 lists the annualized mean returns and the annualized standard devi- 
ations of equity returns in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the world index over the 1985:02-89:12 and 
199O:Ol-97:06  periods.2 The last column shows the Sharpe ratio, defined as 
the return per unit risk, for each of the markets. In the early period, the world 
index dominated investment in each of the individual country equity markets 
in terms of return per unit risk. Japan had the highest mean return and came 
close to matching the Sharpe ratio of  the global index. In the later sample, 
Japanese equity returns declined dramatically and the global portfolio domi- 
nated investment in most national markets in terms of  return per unit risk. 
Given the strong performance of  the equity markets in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, however, investors in those countries actually earned 
higher risk-adjusted returns on investments in their home markets than by di- 
versifying into the global market. 
2. The annualized mean is the monthly mean return times twelve. The annualized standard 
deviation is the standard deviation of  monthly returns times the square root of twelve. 240  Linda L. Tesar 
The strong performance of  particular markets ex post does not undermine 
the ex ante benefits of holding a portfolio of assets with less than perfectly cor- 
related returns. Table 5.3 lists the unconditional correlations between monthly 
equity returns in the same set of countries. The data are broken into the same 
subsamples (198502-89:12  and 199O:Ol-97:06)  to provide some indication 
of  how the correlation structure has changed over time. Panel A of  table 5.3 
shows correlations ranging from .23 between the United States and Japan to 
.8  1 between the United States and Canada, with a cross-country average of .44. 
In the second subsample (panel B), the correlations are generally of the same 
magnitude, with an  average of .40. However, a painvise comparison of the cor- 
relations between the two subsamples suggests that the correlation structure be- 
tween particular equity markets may not be constant over time. 
Longin and Solnik (1995) developed an explicit model of  the conditional 
correlation between equity returns for the seven countries shown in table 5.1 
over the 1960-90 period. They concluded that the correlation between markets 
has risen over time and that the degree of  co-movement tends to be higher 
during periods of higher volatility. Increased correlation across markets is con- 
sistent with-though  not definitive evidence of-greater  integration of finan- 
cial markets. As markets become more tightly linked, global risk factors rather 
than  country-specific factors become more  important in  determining asset 
prices. An  analysis of  the relationship between asset returns and market inte- 
Table 5.3  Correlations between Monthly Equity Returns in Developed Markets 
United  United 

















A. Sample Period: 1985:Ol-1989:12 
1  .oo 
0.46  1.00 
0.26  0.69  1  .oo 
0.26  0.61  0.53  1.00 
0.27  0.46  0.25  0.46  1.00 
0.63  0.53  0.43  0.38  0.36  1.00 
0.81  0.50  0.34  0.27  0.23  0.60  1.00 
0.44 
B. Sample Period: 1990t01-1997:06 
1  .oo 
0.27  1.00 
0.28  0.67  1.00 
0.30  0.33  0.38  1.00 
0.25  0.40  0.30  0.36  1.00 
0.43  0.63  0.58  0.22  0.47  1.00 
0.63  0.44  0.37  0.23  0.24  0.56  1  .OO 
0.40 
~  ~~  ~ 
Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
Note: End-of-month total returns are in U.S. dollars. 241  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Table 5.4  Composition of U.S. Household Assets, 1985-96 
Asset 
Percentage Growth 
1985.0  1990.0  1996.0  1985-96 
A. Household Financial Assets by Type" (billion US$) 
Deposits  2,459.5  3,238.9  3,546.2 
Credit market instrumentsb  805.5  1,501.4  2,003.8 
Corporate equities  1,123.2  1,783.5  4,680.5 
Mutual funds  197.9  467.8  1,582.8 
Life insurance  257.0  380.9  590.2 
Pension fund reserves  2,039.0  3,367.7  6,285.9 
Equity in noncorporate business  2,272.6  2,628.6  2,740.7 
Other financial assetsc  55 1.8  838.5  1,411.1 
Total financial assets  9,706.5  14,207.3  22,841.2 
B. As a Percentage of  Total Financial Asset? 
Deposits  25.3  22.8  15.5 
Credit market instrumentsb  8.3  10.6  8.8 
Corporate equities  11.6  12.6  20.5 
Mutual funds  2.0  3.3  6.9 
Life insurance  2.6  2.7  2.6 
Pension fund reserves  21.0  23.7  27.5 
Other financial assets'  5.7  5.9  6.2 










Source: Board of Governors (various years, table L100: Households and Nonprofit Organizations). 
"Includes assets of private households and nonprofit organizations. 
bIncludes open market paper, U.S. government securities, municipal securities, corporate and for- 
eign bonds, and mortgages. 
'Includes security credit, investment in bank personal trusts, and miscellaneous assets. 
dPercentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
gration is beyond the scope of this paper. Stulz, in chapter 5.2 of this volume, 
provides a detailed discussion of the impact of cross-border portfolio flows on 
asset prices. 
Shifts in Private Saving 
A second factor that can help account for the growth in global equity invest- 
ment in the 1990s is the shift in private savings toward holdings of equity and 
bonds. Since 1980, the share of stocks and bonds-inclusive  of indirect hold- 
ings through mutual funds-has  increased from about 60 percent of total U.S. 
assets to over 80 percent, while the fraction invested in deposits and money 
market funds declined from 40 to less than 20 percent (Morgan 1994; Board 
of Governors, various years). Table 5.4 provides a decomposition of  the assets 
of  U.S. households by type over the 1985-96  peri~d.~  Over this period, the 
3. The data are from the United States Flow of Funds. The figures include the assets of nonprofit 
organizations, which account for approximately 5 percent of total assets in the combined category 
of households and nonprofits. 242  Linda L. Tesar 
fraction of  total household assets accounted for by  mutual fund investment 
grew from 2 to 7 percent, investment in corporate equities from 12 to 20 per- 
cent, and pension fund reserves from 21 to 28 percent. 
Economists offer two explanations for the shift away from traditional bank- 
ing deposits and money market funds toward other financial assets. First, low 
interest rates in 1990 and 1991 made these assets less attractive than stocks 
and bonds. Second, there is evidence that household investment in stocks and 
bonds is strongly correlated with the demographic structure of the US.  popula- 
tion (Morgan 1994). It appears that investors of the baby boomer cohort are 
willing to exchange risk for return as a means of augmenting their savings for 
retirement. In a recent study, Heaton and Lucas (1997) found that even inves- 
tors of retirement age have increased their holdings of stocks and bonds. They 
argued that such a shift is consistent with risk reduction because investors are 
substituting from private business ownership to a more diversified portfolio 
of stocks. 
The shift in saving toward equity investment, particularly through pension 
and mutual funds, plays an important role in the increase in aggregate U.S. 
holdings of foreign equity. Competition among funds for the growing pool of 
savings has pressured fund managers to develop new products with better perfor- 
mance. In addition, by pooling large sums of money, fund managers are able to 
expand into new  markets with  lower transaction costs than  were possible 
through individual stockholder investment.  According to industry reports, over 
10 percent of the net assets of mutual funds in 1996 was allocated to “intema- 
tional equity” (non-U.S.) and “global equity” (U.S. plus non-U.S.) funds (In- 
vestment Company Institute 1997). Although the evidence presented here has 
focused on the United States, there is some evidence that an aging workforce 
and concerns over the viability of  public pension plans are having a similar 
impact on the allocation of saving in Europe (Economist, 29 March 1997). It 
should be noted that this shift toward equity investment does not imply that the 
total volume of  saving has risen, but only that the composition of saving has 
shifted toward equity and bonds, which has in turn induced professional money 
managers to turn to foreign markets. 
Raising Capital on Global Markets 
Demographic shifts and potential gains from diversification help explain the 
increase in the supply of capital to global equity markets. On the demand side, 
the liberalization of markets and the privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
developing and transitional economies brought a growing number of  firms to 
the global equity market as a means of  raising capital. Table 5.5 shows the 
number of  listed companies and the value of  trading on equity markets in 
emerging and developed countries over the 1990-96 period. The growth in the 
number of listed stocks (panel A) reflects the remarkable rate of market reform 
in developing and transitional economies during this period. By  1996, the 
number of  listed securities in developing countries had reached 22,263, ex- 243  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Table 5.5  Number of Listed Companies and Value Traded in Developed and 
Emerging Markets 
Market  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
A. Number of Listed Domestic  Companies 
Developed markets  16,403  16,315  17,227  17,431  19,064  19,467  20,141 
Emerging markets  12,515  9,636  10,359  11,337  17,014  19,397  22,263 
Emergingmarketpercentage  43  37  38  39  47  50  53 
B. Value Traded (billion US$) 
Developed markets  4,617  4,411  4,166  6,634  8,446  10,633  12,011 
Emerging markets  894  606  613  1,069  1,640  1,033  1,575 
Emerging market percentage  16  12  13  14  16  9  12 
Source:  International  Finance  Corporation,  Emerging  Stock  Markers  Facrbook  (Washington, 
D.C., 1996). 
ceeding the total number of listed stocks in the developed markets. The value 
traded (or turnover) on emerging market exchanges reached $1.6 trillion in 
1996, about 12 percent of the total value traded. 
The emergence of new markets broadened the scope of the gains from diver- 
sification for investors in industrialized countries. Table 5.6 shows the annu- 
alized means, standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios for a set of emerging mar- 
kets over the period 1990:02-97:06.  Comparing the figures with the returns 
in industrialized countries (table 5.2, panel B), it is clear that investment in 
emerging markets offers potentially high returns but also carries significant 
risk. The last column in table 5.6 shows the correlation with the U.S. return. 
The average correlation coefficient between the returns in emerging market 
equities with U.S. equity is about one-half the correlation coefficient between 
the equities of the industrialized countries, suggesting that there are significant 
diversification benefits to adding emerging market investments to a portfolio 
of equity from industrialized countries. 
To  further underscore the potential rewards as well as the hazards of  in- 
vesting in emerging markets, figure 5.2 shows the cumulated returns of  one 
dollar invested in January 1990 in Japan, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Mexico, an index of  European, Asian, and Far East stocks (denoted 
EAFE), and an index of  emerging markets (denoted EM)." As of June 1997, 
investors in Japanese equity had suffered a capital loss on their six-and-a-half- 
year investment, while investment in the EM and EAFE indexes earned modest 
capital gains. Investment in the United Kingdom and the United States yielded 
capital gains of  153 and 244 percent, respectively. But the most interesting 
story is the case of Mexico. The impact of  the December 1994 peso crisis is 
clear; the value of  the dollar invested in Mexican equity plummeted from a 
high of $5.11 in January 1994 to $1.58 in February 1995. However, investors 
who either held Mexican equity over the entire time period or purchased equity 
4. The returns are not hedged and therefore contain currency risk as well as country risk. 244  Linda L. Tesar 
Table 5.6  Monthly Equity Returns in Emerging Markets, 19!30:02-97:06 
Market 
Correlation with 
Annualized Mean"  Riskb  Sharpe Ratio'  the United States 





























































Average correlation  0.21 
Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International and International Finance Corporation. 
Note: End-of-month total returns are in U.S. dollars. 
"The annualized mean is the monthly percentage change times twelve. 
bThe annualized standard deviation is the monthly standard deviation times the square root  of 
twelve. 
'The  Sharpe ratio is the annualized mean divided by the annualized standard deviation. 
following the crisis earned capital gains comparable to the U.S. market. Data 
on U.S. net purchases of  foreign equity indicate that U.S. investors were net 
buyers of Mexican equity in December 1994 and January 1995. The data are 
not precise about the exact timing of the purchases within the month. If, how- 
ever, U.S. investors purchased Mexican equity after the decline in prices, they 
may have been able to capitalize on an undervalued market. The link between 
net purchases of foreign equity and equity returns and the timing of investment 
in  foreign equity markets will be discussed in more detail in  section 5.1.4 
below. 
Financial Markets: Channeling Cross-Border Equity Flows 
A number of factors have helped improve the flow of funds from savers lo- 
cated in one national market to firms located in another. In industrialized coun- 
tries, explicit controls on cross-border equity investment have  gradually de- 
clined and in  most cases have been  entirely eliminated. Equity markets in 
developing countries have  also become more accessible to foreign investors 
as part of  the general process of  capital market liberalization and deregula- 
tion. At  the same time, improvements in communications technologies have 
made investors more aware of opportunities available in foreign markets. 
International stock exchanges have struggled to meet the growing appetites 
of domestic investors for foreign equities and the demand for access to capital 
markets on the part of foreign firms. In the United States, for example, differ- 245  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
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Fig. 5.2  Value of a one-dollar investment, 199O:Ol-1997:06 
ences between accounting and disclosure requirements at home and in foreign 
countries have made it difficult for foreign firms to register their stock directly 
on U.S. exchanges. As a consequence, the majority of trading in foreign stocks 
by  U.S. residents occurs either overseas or in over-the-counter, unregistered 
stocks. In  1994, 1,092 foreign stocks were issued on the combined AMEX, 
NYSE, and NASDAQ exchanges while 8,097 stocks were traded on Pink 
Sheets. The majority of American Depository Receipt (ADR) programs are 
also traded as unregistered securities on the over-the-counter market (Coch- 
rane, Shapiro, and Tobin 1995).5  It appears that U.S. investors’ demand for for- 
eign equities is large enough to bear the additional cost and potential risk of 
trading in stocks not under the regulatory control of the Securities and Ex- 
change Commission. 
5.1.3  Cross-Border  Equity Flows 
The demand for capital in emerging markets, the growing share of equity in 
the portfolio of savers, and the response of capital markets to facilitate cross- 
border investment have set the stage for increased capital flows from capital- 
5. The Pink Sheets are listings of foreign stocks and their market makers. ADRs are certificates 
issued by a U.S.  bank to represent ownership of foreign corporate shares. 246  Linda L. Tesar 
rich to capital-poor regions of the world. This section discusses how investors 
have responded to this opportunity for global investment. It first examines the 
magnitude and direction of capital flows on a global scale then turns to the in- 
ternational investment choices of U.S. investors. 
The Composition and Direction of International Capital Flows 
To  put the volume of  cross-border equity investment in some perspective, 
table 5.7  shows the decomposition of international capital flows in industrial- 
ized and developing countries over the 1990-95  period. Among industrialized 
countries, portfolio investment (stocks and bonds) has been the largest channel 
of capital inflows, reaching a peak of $613 billion in 1993. Foreign investment 
in debt securities accounts for the bulk of portfolio investment in industrialized 
countries. The growing importance of equity markets as a means of external 
Table 5.7  Composition of Global Capital Flows 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 



























169.6  112.9  117.7 
213.6  410.9  385.3 
-7.6  99.4  90.0 
208.5  306.7  302.1 
473.0  -57.4  177.5 
31.6  40.9  48.2 
22.5  31.3  48.8 
3.9  6.9  12.0 
19.0  24.9  37.7 
49.8  28.2  38.6 
B. Outj4ows (billion US$) 
-224.4  -  186.7  -  178.8 
-169.1  -317.0  -328.3 
-25.3  -90.6  -76.9 
-141.4  -212.1  -242.1 
-325.0  -44.2  -160.7 
-57.5  -14.1  3.1 
-10.9  -6.7  -11.7 
-17.3  -11.4  -7.3 
-1.3  -1.6  -2.4 
-15.5  -10.3  -5.7 
-4.5  -4.2  -6.9 
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Source: IMF (1996). 
"Trade credits, government and bank loans, currency, and deposits. 247  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Table 5.8  Net Cross-Border  Equity Flows, 1994-95 
Amount  Share of Global Equity 
(billion US$)  Outhflows (%) 
















Rest of world 
A. Net cross-border equity outjows  from 
55.0  54.0 
48.1  50.7 
6.9  3.3 
14.1  -0.2 
56.3  33.8 
0.7  16.0 
125.9  100.6 
9.1  8.6 
B. Net cross-border equity infows to 
5.6  13.3 
0.9  16.4 
4.7  -3.1 
49.0  50.7 
47.1  30.0 
5.8  5.1 
109.9  120.0 

































Source: IMF (1996). 
finance is more obvious in developing countries. Between 1990 and 1995, eq- 
uity inflows as a share of total portfolio inflows increased from 17.4 to 45.2 
percent. On the asset side of  the balance sheet, portfolio investment exceeds 
foreign direct investment as the main form of investment abroad by industrial- 
ized countries. Although the share of portfolio equity investment is rising, the 
bulk of foreign portfolio investment takes place through debt securities. 
Table 5.8 provides more specific information on the source and the destina- 
tion of cross-border equity investment during 1994 and 1995. The data confirm 
that capital markets play an essential role in reallocating capital from capital- 
rich countries to emerging markets. Panel A shows net equity outflows from 
the United States, Canada, Japan, Europe, and aggregate outflows for indus- 
trialized countries and the rest of the world. In 1994 and 1995 industrialized 
countries provided over 90 percent of all net equity outflows, with at least half 
of that amount originating in the United States. Panel B shows that the lion’s 
share of capital outflows from industrialized countries remained as equity in- 
vestment in other industrialized economies. As a percentage of global net capi- 
tal outflows, over one-third was invested in equity from Japan in 1995 and one- 
fifth in Europe. However, there is some evidence of net capital outflows from 
industrialized countries to developing countries. In  1994, 93 percent of  the 
supply of capital originated with investors in industrialized countries, and only 248  Linda L. Tesar 
Table 5.9  Equity Infiows as a Percentage of  Domestic Investment 



































4.0  0.2  13.1  11.8 
1.8  1.7  10.8  10.8 
-0.7  0.8  9.3  4.7 
0.3  1.8  71.1  71.3 
3.0  2.0  5.9  2.0 
0.4  -0.6  1.8  0.8 
4.4  0.8  1.6  3.6 
1.9  0.8  1.4  n.a. 
-  1.7  7.9  13.5  1.2 
2.2  2.9  n.a.  n.a. 
15.6  19.8  64.9  100.1 
2.6  10.9  18.1  3.8 














5.4  0.3  3.4  7.0  9.9  -1.7 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.9  3.4  2.3 
n.a.  n.a.  8.8  22.0  10.7  11.6 
3.9  11.4  7.0  14.3  5.0  1.1 
11.4  4.8  10.3  12.4  10.0  -3.5 
n.a.  -4.2  -4.1  4.8  0.7  5.9 
Sources: IMF (1996) and IMF, International Financial Statistics, annual issue (Washington, D.C., 
1996). 
Note: Investment is measured as gross fixed capital formation. 
81 percent was reinvested in equity from industrialized countries.  Thus roughly 
8 percent of the global supply of equity capital was reallocated from industrial- 
ized to developing countries. In 1995, the fraction invested in "rest  of  the 
world" equities had dropped from 19 to 14 percent, and the share reallocated 
across the two regions fell to 6 percent of the global total. 
Table 5.9 shows the magnitude of equity inflows relative to domestic invest- 
ment (as measured by gross fixed capital formation) in thirteen developed mar- 
kets and six emerging markets. The data suggest that there is considerable 
volatility in equity inflows over time, even when expressed as a share of domes- 
tic investment. In some years the magnitude of foreign equity investment is as 
high as 70 to 100 percent of domestic investment (Finland in 1993 and 1994, 
and Sweden in 1994), though in most years the share of equity inflows is much 
smaller. The table also suggests that, at least for the sample of countries shown, 
the volume and volatility of equity investment in emerging markets is qualita- 
tively similar to that in the developed markets. 
Holdings of Foreign Equity: Is There Still Home Bias? 
While investors have begun to  exploit the gains from cross-border invest- 
ment, the degree of international  diversification is far from the level suggested 249  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
by economic theory. As a benchmark for thinking about the "optimal" level of 
international equity investment, consider an environment in which investors 
from all countries have the same expectations about future returns, have the 
same degree of aversion to risk, face the same set of risks, have the same infor- 
mation about markets, and face no barriers or costs in undertaking interna- 
tional investment. Under these circumstances,  all investors would choose iden- 
tical portfolios. In equilibrium, the asset weights of the optimal portfolio would 
reflect the relative sizes of each national equity market. Table 5.10 shows the 
market capitalization shares for twenty-two developed equity markets and an 
aggregate of  emerging markets for 1990, 1993, and  1996. In this idealized 
world, the share allocated to U.S. equity in the portfolio would have been about 
one-third in 1990 and would have increased to 42 percent by  1996. Japanese 
equity would also have had a weight close to one-third in 1990, but given the 
drop in equity prices in Japan, its optimal weight would have declined to 15 
percent in 1996. By  1996, the optimal weight of emerging markets would have 
reached 11 percent of the total portfolio. 
Estimates of  the actual weight placed on foreign equities by  investors in 
Table 5.10  Country Shares of Global Equity Market Capitalization 

































































































Source:  International Finance  Corporation,  Emerging Stock  Markets Factbook  (Washington, 
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industrialized countries fall far short of the market weights in table 5.10. Tesar 
and Werner (1995) found strong home bias in the portfolios of investors from 
Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1990, 
the estimated weights on foreign equities ranged from 3.3 percent for investors 
from the United States to 23.5 percent for investors from the United Kingdom.6 
The degree of home bias in the U.S. portfolio does appear to be eroding, how- 
ever. Using updated data, Bohn and Tesar (1997) found that the U.S.  invest- 
ment position in foreign equities roughly doubled between 1990 and 1993. 
Figures recently released by the U.S. Treasury Department suggest that these 
estimated foreign portfolio shares for U.S. investors may have understated the 
magnitude of the U.S. investment position in foreign equity markets. The port- 
folio shares cited above are calculated by cumulating net purchases over time 
starting from an initial benchmark position, taking into account capital gains 
and losses. The benchmark position for U.S. portfolio investment in foreign 
markets was based on a survey of U.S. investors’ foreign investment positions 
in long-term securities in 1943.’ The Treasury Department recently surveyed 
3,344 custodians and fund managers regarding the level of  their holdings of 
foreign long-term securities as of 3 1 March 1994. Foreign long-term securities 
covered by the survey include all publicly and privately placed equity and long- 
term debt securities issued by non-U.S. firms, foreign governments, and inter- 
national organizations. ADRs and Global Depository Receipts are considered 
foreign securities if  the underlying securities are claims on firms located out- 
side of the United States.8  Based on the results of the new survey, the estimated 
U.S. investment position in foreign equities has been revised upward from its 
previous level of $228.5 billion9  at the end of  1994 to $595.5 billion. Using the 
estimate of U.S. market capitalization as reported by the International Finance 
Corporation, a rough estimate of the share of the U.S. portfolio invested in for- 
eign equities was  10.66 percent in 1993 and 11.75 percent in 1994.’O 
In principle, if  net purchases accurately reflect transactions in equity be- 
tween domestic and foreign residents, the estimates based on cumulated net 
purchases should provide a good approximation of the investment position re- 
gardless of the date of the benchmark survey. There are three reasons, however, 
to anticipate potentially large errors in the investment positions based on cu- 
mulated net purchases. 
6.  French and Poterba (1  99 1) reported similar figures. 
7. Surveys to measure the magnitude of foreign holdings of U.S. securities have been conducted 
8. For a complete discussion of the survey methodology and the updated investment positions, 
9. Author’s own estimates (see Bohn and Tesar 1997). 
10. A more exact estimate of the portfolio share would be to adjust the denominator for U.S. 
holdings of foreign equities and foreign holdings of U.S. equity. It should also be noted that the 
measure of U.S. market capitalization reported by the International Finance Corporation has con- 
siderably larger coverage than the figures of market capitalization reported by either Morgan Stan- 
ley Capital International (MSCI) or the Financial Times (FT). The share of home equity in the 
U.S. portfolio would obviously be larger if the MSCI or FT  market capitalization were used. 
every five years since 1974. 
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1. Innovations in telecommunications and computing technology and the 
elimination of capital controls in many countries have made it difficult for gov- 
ernment agencies to keep track of the volume of transactions between domestic 
and foreign residents. Although this is a potentially serious problem, it would 
affect purchases as well as sales of foreign securities and may not substantially 
bias the data.lL 
2.  The net purchases data provide no information about which securities 
investors are buying or selling. For lack of a better alternative, estimates of 
investment positions are based on the assumption that investors transact in for- 
eign market indexes. To the extent that investors choose stocks that outperform 
the index, their investment positions in foreign stocks will be underestimated. 
3. The data reflect net purchases cumulated during the month and therefore 
contain no information about the exact timing of transactions in foreign stock. 
If there are large changes in equity returns during a particular month, as in the 
case of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, inaccuracies in the timing of net pur- 
chases can have a large impact on the estimated value of the investment posi- 
tion in that market. 
Although the updated investment position figures reflect a substantial in- 
crease in US.  holdings of foreign equity, a portfolio weight of  12 percent on 
foreign equity is still far below the level predicted by  the simple economic 
model. There are a number of potential explanations for the home bias puzzle, 
though none have provided a definitive solution to the problem. The most obvi- 
ous explanation for home bias is that there may be costs associated with trans- 
acting in foreign markets, such as explicit taxes on foreign equity investment, 
that would deter an investor from undertaking foreign investments and thereby 
skew the portfolio toward domestic assets. There is evidence that government 
restrictions have had an impact on asset prices in developing countries, which 
could explain the low U.S. investment position in emerging markets in the 
early  1990s (see, e.g., Bonser-Neal et al. 1990; Claessens and Rhee 1993). 
However, most explicit limits on holdings in foreign equity have either been 
eliminated or are well above observed portfolio shares and would therefore not 
restrict portfolio allocations. Transaction costs could also hinder cross-border 
investment but again would have to be implausibly large to explain the large 
and persistent degree of home bias. A recent study of the trading costs of in- 
stitutional investors-inclusive  of  fees, commissions, and market impact ef- 
fects-suggests  that costs are indeed higher in emerging stock markets than in 
more developed equity markets. Interestingly, the cost of trading in NASDAQ 
stocks is higher than in many foreign markets due to market impact effects 
(ElkinsMcS herry Company). 
11. Biases would be more likely for countries that impose taxes on cross-border trading or on 
holdings of foreign assets. In comparing data sources on Canadian holdings of U.S.  equity in 1990, 
Tesar and Werner (1992) found that the official figures reported by  the Bank of  Canada were 
smaller than the figures reported by the U.S.  Treasuly Department by a factor of four. One possible 
explanation for the discrepancy is that Canadian holdmgs were underreported to avoid Canadian 
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The high-transaction-costs explanation for home bias also flies in the face 
of  evidence on the volume of trading in foreign securities. Tesar and Werner 
(1995) found that the turnover rate on holdings of foreign equity by U.S. and 
Canadian investors in 1989 was at least double the rate of turnover on their 
home markets.’*  They also found that foreign investors’ turnover rate on hold- 
ings of  U.S. equity was 60 percent higher than the turnover rate on the U.S. 
market. Both findings suggest that transaction costs are not a deterrent to mak- 
ing frequent transactions in foreign stocks. 
A second explanation for home bias is that investors in different countries 
face different risks and that the optimal “hedging” strategy against these risks 
is a portfolio skewed toward domestic securities. Shocks that affect purchasing 
power, such as changes in inflation or shifts in the supply of nontraded goods, 
have been shown in theory to produce home bias in national portfolios under 
some circumstances. When tested empirically, however, these factors have not 
been found to be important enough to generate portfolio weights consistent 
with those observed in most countries (see, e.g., Cooper and Kaplanis 1994; 
Baxter, Jermann, and King 1995; Tesar 1995). Baxter and Jermann (1997) de- 
veloped a model that takes into account the impact of  wages on the optimal 
investment portfolio. Because both labor income and domestic equity returns 
tend to be procyclical, they found that the optimal hedging strategy involves 
holding a short position in domestic equity, further deepening the home bias 
riddle. 
Another explanation for home bias is that investors have better information 
about investments in their home markets than about investments in foreign 
markets and are thus cautious about trading against better informed foreign 
traders (see, e.g., Gehrig 1993). On the surface, such an information bias seems 
plausible. However, investors need little information to pursue a simple buy- 
and-hold strategy that would capture the gains from diversification.  The infor- 
mation bias explanation for home bias is also inconsistent with the large vol- 
ume of trading and turnover in foreign equities. 
Rowland and Tesar (1998) examined the possibility that investment in multi- 
national corporations provides indirect global diversification benefits, thereby 
reducing the need to purchase equity directly in foreign exchanges. Using data 
from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States over the 1984-92 period, they found weak evidence that multi- 
nationals may have provided diversification benefits for U.S. investors, though 
not for investors domiciled in the other six countries. In addition, they reported 
that even after taking the indirect diversification benefits into account, there 
remain significant benefits from diversifying internationally. 
Each of these potential explanations for home bias probably contains more 
12. The turnover rates are derived by  scaling gross purchases and sales in foreign equity by 
holdings. The Treasury’s revised figures for U.S. holdings of foreign securities reduce the aggre- 
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than a kernel of truth. However, the extent and the persistence of home bias in 
the face of seemingly large benefits from diversification remains a puzzle for 
continuing research. 
The U.S. Foreign Portfolio 
The Treasury data also contain information about the allocation of the U.S. 
equity portfolio across foreign markets. Table 5.11 lists the twelve countries 
with the largest weights in the U.S. foreign portfolio as of March 1994. As a 
benchmark, column (1) shows each country’s share of global market capitali- 
zation excluding the United States. Column (2) shows the estimated portfolio 
weights based on the cumulated net purchases series as calculated in Bohn and 
Tesar (1997). Column (3) lists the portfolio weights based on the Treasury’s 
1994 survey. In terms of market capitalization, Japan has the largest market 
share at 34 percent, followed by the United Kingdom at 13 percent, Germany 
at 5.25 percent, and France at 5.17 percent. Both the Bohn-Tesar and Treasury 
estimates place Japan’s share in the U.S. portfolio at around 17 percent, about 
half of  its market share, suggesting that U.S. investors are currently under- 
weighting Japanese equity. U.S. investors tend to overweight equity from the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Mexico with portfolio shares of 17.6,7, and 6.1 
percent (Treasury estimates), respectively.  The factors that cause U.S.  investors 
to adjust their portfolio weights over time are discussed below. By and large, 
the allocation of the U.S. portfolio across foreign stocks roughly corresponds 
to relative market sizes. 
Table 5.11  Allocation of U.S. Portfolio across Foreign Markets, March 1994 
Share of  World Market  Estimates Based  Estimates Based on 
Excluding United States  on Bohn-Tesar  New Treasury Survey 
Market  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Australia  2.3  1.5  3.0 
Canada  3.7  10.7  7.0 
France  5.2  6.0  4.5 
Hong Kong  4.4  7.4  3.1 
Italy  1.5  2.1  2.4 
Japan  34.0  17.0  17.5 
Netherlands  2.1  4.1  6.1 
Sweden  1.2  2.2  2.1 
Switzerland  3.1  5.2  3.1 
United Kingdom  13.0  24.3  17.6 
Mexico  2.3  8.0  6.1 
Germany  5.3  5.0  4.5 
Notes:  Col. (l),  Ratio of market capitalization to global market capitalization excluding the United 
States at the end of 1993. Col. (2), Portfolio shares estimated in Bohn and Tesar (1997). Col. (3), 
Based on Pappas (1997). 254  Linda L. Tesar 
5.1.4  Long-Term Investment or “Hot Money”? 
Foreign equity investment still accounts for only a fraction of the portfolio 
held by investors in industrialized countries. From the perspective of develop- 
ing countries, however, the expansion of equity markets worldwide has resulted 
in a dramatic shift in external finance from official development and bank loans 
to private capital inflows. This growing dependence on private capital inflows 
has caused policymakers to question the reliability and sustainability of equity 
investment as a means of financing long-run development. Is the increase in 
equity investment abroad part of a long-run trend toward greater diversification 
or is it simply a short-run phenomenon that could reverse itself? Do investors 
take a long view in making foreign equity investments, or is equity investment 
“hot money,” in pursuit of  short-run capital gains? Do local factors have a 
significant impact on the allocation of  investment, or are equity flows largely 
driven by global events outside of the control of local policymakers? 
The behavior of U.S. investors in foreign equity markets provides some in- 
sight into these questions. Using monthly data on U.S. net purchases of equi- 
ties in twenty-two countries, Bohn and Tesar (1996, 1997) identified the main 
determinants of foreign equity investment. In general, net purchases of foreign 
equity in a particular market were found to be positively related to the expected 
equity returns in that market.13  In other words, U.S. investors tend to buy equity 
in a particular market if the signals about that market suggest that future returns 
will be high. This suggests that U.S. equity investment is not driven by  fads, 
but that U.S. investors are responsive to local market conditions. 
The behavior of  U.S. investors in foreign markets also sheds light on the 
relative importance of global and local factors in explaining international capi- 
tal flows. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 1996) argued that global fac- 
tors-in  particular, the fall in U.S. interest rates-induced  investors to shift 
their portfolios away from domestic securities to seek higher returns abroad. 
Their study raised concerns that a subsequent increase in U.S. interest rates 
could just as easily cause investors to retreat from foreign markets. Bohn and 
Tesar (1999) found that U.S. interest rates do in fact play a role in explaining 
U.S. net purchases of  foreign equity, but only through their impact on fore- 
casted returns. After conditioning on expected returns and a linear time trend, 
they found no evidence that global variables have an independent influence on 
net equity purchases. 
Finally, there is concern that increased foreign equity investment will pro- 
duce “contagion” effects, that is, that a crisis in one market will spill over into 
other markets. The impact of portfolio flows on asset returns is discussed by 
13. The forecastable component of future equity returns is obtained by regressing current returns 
on a set of predictor variables. Variables that are found to have out-of-sample explanatory power 
for foreign equity returns include lagged measures of the return on the local stock market in U.S. 
dollars less the U.S. safe rate, the local dividend yield, U.S. stock returns, the U.S. interest rate, 
the term structure of  U.S. interest rates, and U.S.  industrial production. 255  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Stulz in chapter 5.2 of this volume. In terms of the transmission effects work- 
ing through quantities, vector autoregressions of net purchases in one market 
on net purchases in other markets yield little evidence of a statistical relation 
between net purchases across markets. There is also no evidence that the Mexi- 
can peso crisis had an impact on U.S. investments in other Latin American or 
Asian markets. 
5.1.5  Conclusions 
Despite the acceleration in cross-border equity flows during the 1990s, the 
internationalization of capital markets is in fact only in its infancy. Of the to- 
tal volume of global equity flows, only a fraction represents a net shift of capi- 
tal investment from capital-rich to capital-poor regions of  the world. There 
remains substantial home bias in the portfolios of investors in the wealthiest 
countries, suggesting that there also remain substantial gains from global di- 
versification. Market reforms and the privatization of state- and family-owned 
enterprises in Europe, Asia, and Latin America are just beginning to take hold. 
For virtually all countries, the gains from increased access to international cap- 
ital markets are sizable. 
The recent crisis in Asia and its “contagious spread” to eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and possibly the United States has caused some economists and poli- 
cymakers to question the benefits of  globally integrated financial markets. 
Ironically, after decades of progress in dismantling capital controls, barriers to 
international capital flow have  again become fashionable under the guise of 
restoring global economic order. While these policies may, in some circum- 
stances, delay the swift transmission of economic crises, the chief consequence 
of capital controls will be to deny firms, individuals, and governments access 
to much needed capital for investment and growth. A better response to global 
uncertainty is to adopt policies that will strengthen domestic institutions, cre- 
ate greater transparency on the part of borrowers, and facilitate coordination 
among national governments. 
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2. Rene‘ M. Stulz 
International Portfolio Flows and Security Markets 
For most of the period following World War 11,  the economic significance of 
net capital flows was small and net portfolio flows were even less important 
(see Feldstein and Horioka 1980).  Over recent years, net capital flows have be- 
come much larger, especially to developing economies. Net portfolio flows are 
now a major component of net capital flows. Table 5.12 gives various estimates 
of  the main components of  net capital flows for developing countries. From 
1977 to  1982, average annual net cumulative portfolio flows  to developing 
countries were negative (-$10.5  billion). In contrast, in the year before the 
Mexican crisis, net portfolio investment of $85.8 billion exceeded net foreign 
direct investment of  $76.3 billion. After recovering from the Mexican crisis, 
net portfolio investment fell again with the Asian crisis. Net portfolio flows 
turned negative for Asian developing countries, but they were not as important 
in the 1990s for these countries as they were for Latin America. To  find a 
period in history when net capital flows were possibly as important as in the 
1990s, one has to go back to the beginning of this century. Strikingly, however, 
while net flows were comparable to the recent experience before World War 
I, there are two important differences. First, to use the expression coined by 
Eichengreen and Fishlow, the current era is the “era of equity finance,” which 
started at the end of  the 1980s when “an unprecented volume and share of 
capital flows to developing countries began to take the form of  equity pur- 
chases by individual investors . . . through their institutional representatives” 
(1998,24).  Second, gross flows are dramatically larger today than ever before. 
A good example of  this is the turnover in foreign exchange markets which 
exceeds one trillion dollars a day (Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim 1998). 
Part of this paper was written while the author was a Bower Fellow at the Harvard Business 
School. The author is grateful for comments from Warren Bailey, Geert Bekaert, Cam Harvey, 
Martin Feldstein, Anthony Richards, Linda Tesar, Ingrid Werner, an anonymous referee, and con- 
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Table 5.12  Capital Flows to Developing Countries (billions of U.S. dollars) 
A. Net Capital Flows to Developing Countries, 1977-94  (yearly average) 
1977-82  1983-89  1990-94 
Total net capital flows  30.5  8.8  104.9 
Net direct investment  11.2  13.3  39.1 
Net portfolio investment  -  10.5  6.5  43.6 
Other  29.8  -11.0  22.2 
B. Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Markets 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998' 
Net private capital flows  133.6  147.3  190.9  131.8  87.6 
Net direct investment  76.3  86.3  108.6  126.7  106.2 
Net portfolio investment  85.8  22.2  52.5  51.8  38.0 
Other net investment  -28.6  38.8  29.7  -46.6  -56.6 
C. Net Private Capital Flows to Asia 
1994  1995  1996  1997  199P 
Net private capital flows  64.8  91.7  100.2  21.5  -18.3 
Net direct investment  44.4  51.0  60.2  60.2  45.1 
Net portfolio investment  11.5  10.0  10.1  7.5  -6.5 
Other net investment  9.0  30.8  29.9  -46.3  -56.9 
~~  ~~  ~ 
Sources: Panel A, Folkerts-Landau and It0 (1995); panels B and C, IME World Economic Outlook 
and International Capital Markets (Washington, D.C., 1998). 
aNumbers  are estimates 
The increased relevance of net portfolio flows results first and foremost from 
the liberalization of  financial markets in developing economies. This liber- 
alization made it possible for investors from developed countries to invest in 
many emerging markets where previously they could not invest. As part of the 
liberalization, many countries engaged in large-scale privatization programs 
that increased the supply of  equity from these countries. Even if  investors 
from developed countries had kept their share of the capitalization of emerging 
equity markets constant, large capital flows would have taken place because of 
the increased capitalization of the emerging markets in which investors could 
buy securities as a result of  the opening of markets and of privatization pro- 
grams. However, investors also increased their share of  the capitalization of 
emerging equity markets. The scope for further liberalization and privatization 
programs has narrowed, but large capital flows could result from increases in 
portfolio allocations to emerging markets. Currently, investors in major devel- 
oped countries invest less than 1 percent of their assets in emerging markets. 
A 1  percent increase in this allocation corresponds to net capital flows of more 
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Net portfolio flows should lower the cost of  capital in many countries and 
facilitate the flow of capital to firms and countries that have the best investment 
opportunities irrespective of their locations. Overall, net portfolio flows should 
therefore be an engine of worldwide growth. This should be even more so be- 
cause portfolio investments subject firms and countries to the discipline of cap- 
ital markets. To attract and keep portfolio investments, firms and countries have 
to behave so as to maximize the value of  these investments and are punished 
when they do not. As a result, firms and countries have greater incentives to in- 
vest efficiently. These arguments in favor of unrestrained portfolio flows are 
powerful, but many argue that they are flawed because investors are sometimes 
moved by “animal spirits” rather than rational thinking, so that portfolio flows 
have a dark side that can destabilize countries and reduce growth. The large 
net capital flows of the 1990s and the concomitant increase in the role of inter- 
national investors in developing countries have led many to reconsider the ben- 
efits and costs of net portfolio inflows with some urgency. 
The Mexican crisis has been an important cause of  this reconsideration. It 
prompted many to worry about the stability of  portfolio investments. Con- 
trasting the Mexican crisis to the debt crisis of the early 1980s highlights why 
sudden changes in portfolio flows might be a source of concern. With the debt 
crisis, there were few key players in developed countries, their claims were 
illiquid, and they had strong incentives to work out solutions with the devel- 
oping countries. With the Mexican crisis, coordination among portfolio inves- 
tors was impossible. Even though collectively investors might have been better 
off committing funds to the Mexican government to resolve the crisis, individ- 
ually each investor was better off selling out and could do so quickly because 
he was holding liquid securities. A number of economists have therefore ar- 
gued that financing a country’s growth through portfolio investment can expose 
it to sudden inflows and outflows that can destabilize an otherwise sound econ- 
omy, force it into dramatic macroeconomic adjustments, and wreak havoc in 
its security markets. After worrying about the insufficient economic impor- 
tance of net capital flows, some economists now worry that there might be too 
much portfolio investment. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco aptly summarized this 
concern: “In today’s world of  fickle private capital movements, it is argued, 
large inflows leave a country exposed to the latest mood of Wall Street traders” 
(1996, 171).  This leads economists such as Williamson to say that they “would 
not urge complete liberalization prior to (a) evidence that . . . controls have 
become completely ineffective (and hopelessly corrupting), or (b) the assur- 
ance that inflows will not be excessive” (1993, 14). 
The Asian crisis has added fuel to this growing reconsideration of the bene- 
fits of capital flows. For instance, Stiglitz (1998) called for greater regulation 
of  capital flows, arguing that “developing countries are more vulnerable to 
vacillations in international flows than ever before.” Radelet and Sachs (1998) 
attributed the crisis to panic from foreign investors. Krugman (1998) summa- 
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“What turned a bad financial situation into a catastrophe was the way a loss of 
confidence turned into self-reinforcing panic. In 1996 capital was flowing into 
emerging Asia at the rate of about $100 billion a year; by the second half of 
1997 it was flowing out at about the same rate. Inevitably, with that kind of 
reversal Asia’s asset markets plunged, its economies went into recession, and 
it only got worse from there.” He then went on to argue that the solution is to 
impose currency controls, finishing with an apocalyptic description of what 
would happen without them: “But if Asia does not act quickly, we could be 
looking at a true Depression scenario-the  kind of slump that 60 years ago 
devastated societies, destabilized governments, and eventually led to war.” 
In this paper, we examine these concerns about the implications of net port- 
folio flows in light of the existing empirical evidence and theories of  inter- 
national portfolio investment. In section 5.2.1 we evaluate the impact of liber- 
alization on equity valuations and on the cost of  capital. In section 5.2.2 we 
address the issue of  cross-country  comovement in valuations  and examine 
whether there is contagion in international financial markets. In section 5.2.3 
we consider whether net portfolio flows can drive valuations away from funda- 
mentals and make asset prices more volatile. Section 5.2.4 attempts to provide 
an assessment of the net benefits of openness to portfolio investment. 
5.2.1  Capital Market Liberalization and Equity Valuations 
The past twenty-five years in international  capital markets have seen the 
dismantling of  the restrictions on capital flows resulting from the two world 
wars. At the end of World War 11, capital markets were essentially completely 
segmented. Because of restrictions on capital flows, investors mostly held as- 
sets from their home countries. International investment took the form of offi- 
cial capital flows. Some restrictions were soon lifted as currencies became con- 
vertible, but other restrictions were added periodically as governments in many 
countries tried to direct economic activity by  reducing the role of markets. 
Since the 1970s, most of these restrictions have been removed. First, the mar- 
kets of developed economies were deregulated. Countries removed obstacles 
to exchange rate transactions, agreed to tax agreements that reduced obstacles 
to international investment, and eliminated restrictions on foreign ownership 
that were often binding. Developing countries started to deregulate later than 
the developed countries, and many such countries have only taken timid steps 
in that direction. Nevertheless, many of these countries have eliminated obsta- 
cles to capital flows and promoted equity market deregulation actively. 
Though economists in general are enthusiastic about the benefits of  free 
trade in goods, they often seem surprisingly reluctant in their assessment of 
the gains from free trade in securities. For instance, Bhagwati (1  998) stated: 
“This is a seductive idea: freeing up trade is good, why not also let capital 
move freely across borders? But the claims of enormous benefits from free 
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from those who oppose to those who favor liberated capital.”’ This is surpris- 
ing because a country cannot take full advantage of the benefits of  free trade 
in goods without full capital mobility. Capital mobility allows a country to 
produce more efficiently and enables the residents to bear fewer of the risks 
associated with domestic production. To understand these two effects of capital 
mobility, we consider a country with no capital flows that, for the sake of illus- 
tration, has a well-defined comparative advantage in producing coffee beans. 
We then consider the impact on that country of capital flow liberalization. 
In the absence of capital flows, a country cannot have net trade flows. Conse- 
quently, residents have to bear all the country’s risks. If they produce only cof- 
fee beans, any shock to the price at which they can sell coffee beans affects 
the country’s income in direct proportion to the size of the crop. Any damage 
to the crop also affects the country’s income directly. Since the price of coffee 
beans is quite volatile and crop yields can vary unexpectedly, the country’s in- 
come would be quite volatile if it devoted all its resources to producing coffee 
beans. To avoid this volatility, the only solution in the absence of capital flows 
is to diversify production. This means that the country produces other goods 
even though it is less efficient at  doing so. In  the interest of  smoothing its 
income, the country therefore limits the extent to which it takes advantage of 
the benefits of international trade. 
In a country with a market economy, the channel through which production 
will be directed away from the coffee bean industry is the stock market. In the 
stock market, investors are rewarded for bearing risk with a risk premium. A 
stock‘s risk premium is the expected return of the stock in excess of the return 
of an investment that has no risk. For instance, the average annual risk premium 
on the U.S. stock market from 1926 to 1990 was 6.1 percent. Because coffee 
bean production leads to volatile returns, investors require a high risk premium 
to invest in that industry and a lower risk premium to invest in industries that 
provide diversification from the coffee bean industry. As a result, industries 
that provide diversification from the coffee bean industry are able to obtain 
capital at low cost. They can promise lower returns to investors because invest- 
ing in them reduces portfolio volatility. The low cost of capital in industries that 
allow investors to diversify the return on their investments makes it possible 
for these industries to compete successfully against imports. As a result of this 
diversification effect, the country produces in industries for which it does not 
have a comparative advantage. 
Consider now the impact on that country of allowing unrestricted capital flows 
and assume that there is no dark side to capital flows. Immediately, as investors 
learn that capital flows will be allowed, the risk premium in the coffee bean in- 
dustry falls. As investors throughout the world invest in the country’s  coffee bean 
1. Even before the recent crises, prominent economists advocated various kinds of taxes to limit 
international trade in securities in order to decrease speculative capital flows. See Summers and 
Summers (1989) and Tobin (1978). 262  Rent5 M. Stulz 
production, they find that good events in that industry mostly offset bad events 
in their portfolios so that investing in coffee bean production actually reduces 
the risk of their portfolios. This means that the risks associated with coffee 
bean production are largely diversifiable internationally, so that the world capi- 
tal markets require a much smaller risk premium to bear such risks and might 
require no risk premium at all. As the risk premium for the coffee bean industry 
falls, the country invests more in that industry. Simultaneously, the local indus- 
tries that helped residents diversify their coffee bean production risks no longer 
offer that benefit to residents since residents can diversify internationally. Con- 
sequently, these industries may well contemplate an increase in their cost of 
capital and decreased investment. Once this process is completed, the country 
might specialize in the industry for which it has a comparative advantage. 
We have shown that capital market liberalization leads to a reallocation of 
capital across industries. Obstfeld (1994) showed that this is not the whole 
story. Because the risks of a country’s production can be diversified internation- 
ally after capital market liberalization, production technologies that were too 
risky before liberalization become advantageous because their risks can be di- 
versified internationally. Hence, if  riskier technologies are those with higher 
expected output, liberalization makes it possible for a country to shift to riskier 
production technologies and hence experience higher growth. 
To have a better understanding of the transition from complete segmentation 
to a completely open capital market, it is helpful to use a numerical example. 
Suppose a country specializes in coffee bean production, the average annual 
value of the crop is $1 billion, and the annual volatility is $400 million. This 
means that each year there is a 5 percent probability that the country’s income 
is below $340 million (assuming that the value of the crop is normally distrib- 
uted). The country therefore experiences high income volatility. To simplify 
the discussion, let’s assume that all the income accrues to capital. Because of 
the high volatility, suppose that investors require a risk premium of 10 percent 
for investments in the coffee bean industry and that the risk-free interest rate 
is 10 percent. This means that domestic residents are willing to invest in the 
coffee bean industry only if they expect to earn 20 percent annually, the sum 
of the rate that they receive on investments without risk plus the risk premium. 
The only way they can expect to earn 20 percent annually by investing in cof- 
fee bean production is if the value of the industry is the present value of a cash 
flow stream of $1 billion a year discounted at the rate of 20 percent. Conse- 
quently, the value of the coffee bean industry is $5 billion. An industry whose 
cash flows do not move with the cash flows of the coffee industry would have 
little risk for an investor heavily invested in the coffee bean industry and that 
investor would require a low risk premium to invest in that industry. Hence, 
that industry could raise funds promising an expected return to investors close 
to 10 percent. A dollar of annual average income from that industry is therefore 
worth $10. 
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the risk of  the production of  coffee becomes a risk diversified in portfolios 
throughout the world. The risk premium on the coffee industry almost disap- 
pears, so that the present value of the perpetuity of $1 billion is now close to 
$10 billion. In other words, liberalization has a dramatic effect on the equity 
market capitalization. At the same time, however, the diversifying industry 
might now face a risk premium of 5 percent, so that its cost of capital increases 
from 10 percent to 15 percent. A dollar of average income in that industry falls 
from $10 to slightly more than $6. As with trade liberalization, not everybody 
benefits from capital market liberalization. However, as with trade liberaliza- 
tion, those who gain can compensate those who lose in such a way that every- 
body is made better off. 
The decrease in the cost of  capital has three effects on the coffee industry. 
First, it increases the value of the expected cash flows from existing invest- 
ments since these expected cash flows are discounted at a lower rate. Second, 
it makes investments profitable that were not profitable at the higher cost of 
capital. Thus there will be an investment boom in the coffee industry. The third 
effect is that new investors will come to the industry and monitor firms in that 
industry.*  These investors will have new ideas and will want to influence the 
actions of firms to make sure that their investments are profitable. Foreign in- 
vestors will therefore improve corporate governance in the coffee industry, 
which will increase the value of the industry. 
Our analysis of opening up security markets in a country has four empirical 
implications: (1) foreign investors acquire domestic securities; (2) domestic 
valuations increase; (3) the cost of capital falls; and (4)  growth increases. We 
now consider the empirical evidence on these four implications. We  focus on 
capital account liberalizations in developing economies both because of their 
intrinsic interest and because they constitute well-defined events. 
Liberalization and Foreign Investment 
Our analysis of  liberalization assumes that foreign investors invest in the 
liberalized market rapidly. If this does not happen, no risk sharing takes place 
and asset prices do not increase. It is well known that holdings of foreign se- 
curities are small within portfolios of investors in developed countrie~.~  Con- 
sequently, most of a developed country’s equity is held by domestic residents. 
For instance, according to the NYSE 1996 fact book, foreigners held about 6 
percent of U.S. equity at the end of the third quarter of 1996 (NYSE 1997,59). 
This so-called home bias in portfolios implies that, even though portfolio flows 
have been large, domestic investors still have to bear a large fraction of the 
risks associated with domestic production. This limits the extent to which the 
cost of capital falls following liberalization. 
Empirically, portfolio flows grow significantly as liberalization occurs. Kim 
2. See Stulz (1999) for an analysis of  the corporate governance benefits of globalization. 
3. See Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), French and Poterba (1991), and Tesar and Werner (1994). 264  Rene M. Stulz 
Table 5.13  Estimates of U.S. and Foreign Ownership for Selected 
Emerging Markets 
U.S. Ownership  Foreign Ownership 
(8  of market  (% of market 
Country  capitalization)  capitalization) 
Argentina  20 
Brazil  6 
Chile  4 
Columbia  6 
China  - 







Indonesia  6  - 
Mexico  21  25 
Peru  -  38 
Thailand  6  - 
Venezuela  43  36 
Malaysia  1  - 
Source: Estimates of U.S. ownership are from Bekaert and Harvey (1999), who cumulate flow of 
funds data until the end of  1995. Estimates of  foreign ownership  are from Campollo-Palmer 
(1997). 
and Singal (1993) documented that initially following liberalization there is a 
short period of  net capital outflow, after which net capital flows turn positive 
and become large. This effect varies across countries. Liberalizations differ in 
degree across countries dramatically, so it is not surprising that foreign inves- 
tors build larger stakes in some countries than in others. Table 5.13 provides 
estimates of U.S. equity investment and foreign equity investment in a number 
of emerging markets. For most countries, foreign ownership is difficult to esti- 
mate precisely. The table shows this vividly for Venezuela where the estimate 
of  U.S. ownership exceeds the estimate of  foreign ownership! Nevertheless, 
these numbers show that, on average, liberalization leads to substantial foreign 
equity holdings. These foreign equity holdings are generally large compared 
to foreign equity holdings in the United States. Consequently, the home bias 
has a somewhat different meaning for developing economies than for large de- 
veloped economies. Because the capitalization of emerging markets is small, 
an investment corresponding to a small fraction of the capitalization of U.S. 
markets represents a large fraction of the capitalization of many emerging mar- 
kets. One way to understand this is that in 1997 Bill Gates could have bought 
all the equity of Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Nigeria, Poland, Sri Lanka, Venezu- 
ela, and Zimbabwe-and  would still have  had $7 billion left to invest else- 
where. 
Estimates of the Increase in Valuations Resulting from Liberalization 
With our example, the capital market liberalization induces an increase in 
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crease in investment. Because of the home bias, the economic importance of 
these effects of liberalization is an empirical issue. It is relatively straightfor- 
ward to look at stock market returns and evaluate whether they are unusually 
high at the time a country liberalizes. We will see that it is harder to figure out 
whether the cost of capital falls. 
The large returns on emerging markets over the past fifteen years are well 
known. For instance, from December 1984 to December 1994 the real value 
of emerging market equity increased by 202 percent; in comparison, the S&P 
500 increased by 93.5 percent. These large returns are in part responsible for 
the interest of portfolio managers in these markets. Since so many liberaliza- 
tions took place during that period, the performance of emerging markets is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction of increases in equity valuations ac- 
companying liberalization. However, stock market valuations are not affected 
by  liberalization of capital flows only. Liberalization of capital flows is often 
accompanied by other events affecting the economy that liberalizes. For in- 
stance, the economy might have a new political regime that is market oriented 
and undertakes extensive domestic reforms that increase stock market valua- 
tions. Also, the performance of the stock market depends on how the economy 
is performing, so macroeconomic conditions have to be taken into account. 
To assess the effect of liberalization on equity valuations, it is therefore im- 
portant to pay  close attention to other events that take place in the country 
that liberalizes its markets. This task is made more difficult by  the fact that 
liberalization is rarely a one-shot event. Countries liberalize some aspects of 
their markets at one time and others at some other time. Henry (1999b) pain- 
stakingly identified individual economic reform and capital flow liberalization 
events that affected twelve emerging markets. Presumably, by the time the lib- 
eralization takes place, its effects are already incorporated in stock prices be- 
cause investors have been aware of it for some time. It turns out that for the 
seven months preceding the first liberalization, equity returns are about 40 per- 
cent after adjusting for world market equity returns. However, once Henry 
(1999b) controlled for other events that affect these economies and for macro- 
economic conditions, he concluded that the effect is on the order of  18 percent. 
He found an effect of  16 percent for subsequent liberalizations. This suggests 
a cumulative effect of about 37 percent. 
The Impact of Liberalization on the Cost of Capital 
The evidence of Henry (1999b) shows that capital flow liberalization has a 
large effect on equity valuations. In our earlier analysis, we argued that liberal- 
ization, by reducing the cost of capital, can have such an effect. The question 
that arises out of Henry’s evidence is how large the impact of  liberalization is 
on the cost of capital. Suppose that the reevaluation effect is 37 percent. In this 
case, the reevaluation takes $1 invested in a market and brings it to $1.37. This 
reevaluation captures all the effects of  liberalization discussed earlier. Since 
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$.37 reevaluation is an upper bound on the impact of the decrease in the cost 
of  capital. This upper bound implies that a country where the cost of  capital 
for a project of typical risk was 20 percent now has a cost of capital of no less 
than 16.6 percent. In other words, the cost of capital of that country falls at 
most by  17 percent. 
The sharp stock market increase associated with liberalization suggests that 
it might be straightforward to measure directly the impact of liberalization on 
the cost of capital. It turns out that this is not an easy task. The equity cost of 
capital is the expected return that investors anticipate from equity investments. 
As this cost falls, entrepreneurs can raise more funds for a project. Measuring 
the return that investors expect on equity is a difficult undertaking. One might 
be tempted to use past returns to forecast future returns. However, this strategy 
is not possible in the case of markets that undergo a liberalization. For such 
markets, the past returns are those appropriate for the segmented economy 
that no longer exists following liberalization. To complicate things further, past 
average returns for such markets are high for two reasons. First, segmented 
markets have higher risk premiums because domestic investors have to hold 
more domestic equity than they would in the absence of segmentation. Second, 
as discussed, liberalization boosts equity valuations as the cost of capital falls. 
Hence, the prospect of lower expected returns on equity has the paradoxical 
implication of increasing average returns on equity when measured over the 
liberalization period. This is because the expected cash flows on equity are 
discounted at a lower rate. 
A second strategy to estimate the change in the cost of capital is to assume 
that following liberalization the expected return is determined by how the risk 
of  equity is priced in global markets. To do this, one has to posit a model of 
how risk is priced in global markets and one has to assume that this model 
applies to equities of liberalized markets. For such an approach to make sense, 
one has to believe that it is reasonable to treat the world as if liberalized mar- 
kets form one big market where capital flows freely across markets to equal- 
ize risk-adjusted returns. To  proceed further, we  therefore have to consider 
whether it is reasonable to think of  the world of liberalized markets as one 
big market. 
If  investors can move capital freely across countries, they can diversify their 
portfolios internationally. This means that risks that are specific to small coun- 
tries typically do not matter much in their portfolios. If  their investments in 
one small country do poorly because of events specific to that country, their 
investments in another small country might be doing well. On balance, there- 
fore, these risks offset each other. By diversifying internationally, investors can 
form a portfolio that has a lower volatility for a given expected return. Since 
investors would rather bear less risk than more, they should prefer this strategy. 
A reasonable measure of the gain that American investors can make by diver- 
sifying internationally was provided by  DeSantis and  Gerard (1  997). They 
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developed economies had the same volatility as a well-diversified portfolio of 
American equities but the annual expected return was higher by about 2.5 per- 
cent. Adding emerging markets to this portfolio would lead to further gains 
from diversification. For a portfolio to be well diversified internationally, how- 
ever, its holdings have to be in the same proportions as the capitalization of 
securities from each country. A portfolio that holds the same proportion of the 
capitalization of each security in the world is called the world market portfolio. 
Hence, since emerging markets represent about  12 percent of  world market 
capitalization, a well-diversified portfolio has an investment of about 12 per- 
cent in emerging markets. 
An  investor who holds a portfolio that is well diversified internationally 
measures the risk of a security by its contribution to the volatility of that portfo- 
lio. As the volatility of her portfolio increases, she bears more risk. Hence, she 
is only willing to hold a security that contributes significantly to the volatility 
of  the portfolio if  she receives enough of  a reward in the form of a risk pre- 
mium. A security contributes more to the volatility of her portfolio if that secu- 
rity moves more together with the other securities in the portfolio. Such a secu- 
rity has little diversification value since, if  the portfolio performs poorly, that 
security is highly likely to perform poorly also. A security can have high vola- 
tility and yet have little co-movement with the portfolio. The investor will not 
be concerned about the volatility of such a security because most of the ran- 
domness of its return will be diversified away in the portfolio. 
The part of the return of a security that cannot be diversified away is the part 
that moves with the return of the whole portfolio. Financial economists call 
this part of the return of a security its systematic risk. A simple model of the 
risk of securities in markets where capital flows freely is the international capi- 
tal asset pricing model, which states that the return of a security in excess of 
the risk-free rate is equal to the systematic risk of that security times the risk 
premium on the world market portfolio.4 The measure of the systematic risk of 
a security for a well-diversified investor is the degree to which it moves with 
the world market portfolio. For instance, if the world market portfolio has a 1 
percent return, one can expect the U.S. market portfolio to have a 0.84 percent 
return while the Argentinian market portfolio is only expected to return 0.19 
per~ent.~  Consequently, the U.S. market portfolio has substantially more sys- 
tematic risk than the market portfolio of Argentina and should earn a higher 
expected return. A security that covaries more with the world market portfolio 
must promise investors a higher expected return because it has more risk that 
investors cannot diversify away. With this model, the equity cost of capital is 
equal to the risk-free interest rate plus the systematic risk of the security times 
the risk premium of the world market portfolio. If we take the risk premium of 
the world market portfolio to be 6 percent, the Argentinian market portfolio 
4.  See Stulz (1995) for a detailed analysis of the theory and empirical tests of it. 
5. These estimates are from Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996). 268  Ren6 M. Stulz 
would be expected to earn 1.14 percent in excess of the risk-free rate and the 
U.S. market portfolio 5.4 percent. 
The international  capital asset pricing  model has been  tested extensively 
with some degree of success, especially among developed countries. There is 
clear evidence that the returns of securities are related to their systematic risk. 
Countries whose markets covary more with the world market have higher eq- 
uity returns on average, as predicted. At the same time, however, such a simple 
model has limitations. There are regularities that it cannot explain. For in- 
stance, it understates the required return from small firms and tends to overstate 
the required return from growth firms. Part of  the difficulty for the model is 
that countries still have obstacles to capital flows. Nevertheless, the clear lesson 
from the empirical evidence is that, for countries whose capital markets are 
fairly open, the primary determinant of the valuation of securities is their risk 
as measured on international capital markets. 
Like Argentina, most emerging markets have traditionally had little system- 
atic risk. As these markets liberalize, the valuations of their securities are in- 
creasingly determined on international capital markets. As a result, valuations 
increase because the securities do not have much systematic risk. It is not the 
case, however, that these markets become completely  integrated into world 
markets as soon as they liberalize. Liberalizations  are generally partial, and 
there is always a risk that a country will adopt new restrictions on capital flows. 
Hence, the expected returns on emerging market common stocks are best de- 
scribed as a mix between expected returns determined on world markets and 
expected returns  determined  on local markets,  with the mix changing over 
time." If liberalizations were complete and credible and if there were no home 
bias, liberalizations would have a more dramatic effect on stock returns. Going 
back to our example where we argued that the empirical evidence suggests a 
fall in the cost of capital of  17 percent, one would expect the cost of capital to 
fall from 20 percent to about 10 percent rather than to 16.66 percent if the li- 
beralized market became completely integrated into world capital markets. In 
this case, a liberalization would more than double equity valuations. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1999) proposed a third approach to investigate the im- 
pact of liberalization on the cost of capital. They argued that the ratio of the 
dividend to the share price is a good proxy for the cost of capital. They then 
investigated how this proxy changes as a country liberalizes. Generally, they 
found that liberalization  decreases the cost of  capital by  a relatively  small 
amount (less than 100 basis points). Compared with the predictions one ob- 
tains from the applying the international capital asset pricing model, the esti- 
mates of Bekaert and Harvey (1 999) are surprisingly small. Though the esti- 
mates implied by  the work of Henry (1999b) are somewhat larger, they are 
also small compared to the predictions from the international capital asset pric- 
ing model. A plausible explanation is that the impact of liberalization on the 
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cost of capital is limited because of the extent of home bias. If foreign investors 
do not buy the equity of liberalized countries, the cost of capital for that coun- 
try does not de~line.~ 
One last point should be made. As investors become better able to diversify 
their portfolios internationally, they bear less risk. If  investors require more 
compensation to bear more risk, this means that the compensation for risk 
falls. Hence, greater globalization of capital markets implies a fall in the cost 
of capital everywhere because the risk premium on the world market portfo- 
lio falls. 
The Impact on Growth 
From our analysis, liberalization decreases the cost of capital. This should 
lead to an increase in growth because investment projects that were not advan- 
tageous before liberalization become advantageous afterward. Henry (1999a) 
provided direct evidence on this issue. He showed that liberalization induces 
an increase of 23 percent in private investment the year following liberalization 
and an increase of 24 percent the year after that. He also found that his estimate 
of the stock market effect of liberalization helps predict the increase in invest- 
ment following liberalization. 
We have seen that globalization increases stock market valuations, increases 
growth, and increases welfare. The question we  have  to address is whether 
there is a dark side of globalization that negates or even dwarfs these positive 
effects. We have proceeded as if capital markets work efficiently in allocating 
capital to its best uses. Instead, those concerned about capital flows are likely 
to believe Bhagwati’s argument that “only an untutored economist will argue 
that, therefore, free trade in widgets and life insurance policies is the same as 
free capital mobility. Capital flows are characterized, as the economic histor- 
ian Charles Kindleberger of  the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology has 
famously noted, by panics and manias” (1998, 8). The panics and manias are 
generally presumed to translate into contagion effects and volatility effects of 
capital flows. We therefore investigate  the concerns about contagion in the next 
section and those about volatility in section 5.2.3. 
5.2.2  How Do Changes in One Market Affect Other Markets? 
With free capital flows, markets are connected. Investors who think that one 
market will have  higher returns can move  their investments to that market. 
Some have argued that this connection implies that markets move  together 
more than they would if they were segmented. As investor sentiment changes 
in one large country, they argue, this change affects stock returns throughout 
the world irrespective of fundamentals. This view suggests that stock moves 
7. See Stulz (1999) for a simple model showing the relation between the cost of capital impact 
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are contagious. To evaluate this claim, it is important to understand what moves 
stock prices. In section 5.2.1 we thought of stock prices as the present value of 
cash flows. Consequently, stock prices can change because expected cash flows 
change or because of changes in discount rates. The discount rate is the risk- 
free rate plus a risk premium. This means that the discount rate can change be- 
cause of interest rates or risk premiums. 
In global markets, the risk premium is determined globally. For instance, the 
risk premium on U.S.  stocks is not determined in the United States alone. 
Chan, Karolyi, and Stulz (1992) documented that the risk premium on U.S. 
stocks and the risk premium on Japanese stocks are clearly connected, so that 
changes in the risk premium on Japanese stocks also affect the risk premium 
on U.S.  stocks. This effect naturally induces co-movements in stock prices 
across the world, and it does not imply that investors are irrational or that stock 
prices disregard economic fundamentals. It  does mean, however, that US. 
stock prices can change in circumstances where, if the United States were an 
isolated country, they would not change. We  now  examine stock price co- 
movements and whether they have changed as capital flows became less re- 
stricted. 
Have Co-movements Increased over Time? 
Much of the analysis of stock price co-movements has focused on one mea- 
sure of  co-movement, namely, the correlation of  stock returns, which takes 
values  between  -1  and  +l. 'Ifrpically, well-diversified portfolios  of  U.S. 
stocks have  a correlation close to one. Historically, however, correlations of 
foreign indexes with the US. market have been small, especially for emerging 
markets, where they often have been indistinguishable from zero. At the same 
time, though, these correlations change over time. This makes it difficult to 
figure out whether correlations are greater now than they used to be. This task 
is further complicated by the fact that these correlations are not well under- 
stood. Although many authors have tried to construct models that explain how 
they change over time and how they differ across countries, this literature has 
had little success. Table 5.14 provides a comparison of correlations of  stock 
markets with the world market portfolio over two periods. One period is the 
sample period for which returns were available. The other period corresponds 
to the first five years of the 1990s (April 1990 to March 1995). Correlations 
have changed, but some increased and others decreased. The average correla- 
tion is .35 for the whole sample period and .41 for 1990-95.  Hence, on aver- 
age, correlations increased, but not by much. Many recent papers have looked 
at the issue of whether correlations have increased over time using sophisti- 
cated statistical techniques.8  There is evidence of an increase in correlations, 
but the extent of this increase differs across studies and some studies do not 
report an increase. One important issue that affects the conclusions of  the ex- 
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isting studies is that some include the crash of  1987 and others do not. Over 
a short period of  time in  1987, markets moved  together by  extremely large 
amounts. Including data from that period has the effect of increasing correla- 
tions. Hence one's conclusion about the evolution of correlations depends on 
whether or not one takes into account the crash. DeSantis and Gerard (1997) 
examined the correlation between the U.S. market and an equally weighted 
portfolio of nine other large developed markets. They used a statistical model 
to  estimate monthly  correlations. Their  sample period  was  January  1970 
through December 1994. The twenty lowest correlation estimates are all from 
before 1980. Sixteen of  the twenty largest correlations are from after 1980. 
Their evidence shows that there is high correlation in periods of extremely low 
stock returns. Their average correlation is .56. However, the S&P 500 dropped 
by 29.42 percent from September to November 1987. They reported their high- 
est correlation, .76, for that period. The second highest correlation they re- 
ported is during the period from January 1973 to September 1974, when the 
stock market dropped 45.06 percent. There is now considerable evidence that 
correlations are high in bear markets. It is difficult to attribute this to liberaliza- 
tion since correlations were high during the bear market of the 1970s also. This 
phenomenon creates concerns about the benefits of  international diversifica- 
tion, however. Our analysis in section 5.2.1 argued that the benefit of inter- 
national diversification is that some countries do well while others are doing 
poorly. If correlations are high during bear markets, this suggests that countries 
are more likely to do poorly at the same time, which reduces the benefits from 
international diversification. 
What about correlations for emerging markets? In table 5.14 the average 
correlation for the emerging markets is .17 for the whole sample period, which 
is  roughly  half  the  average correlation for all countries and  confirms that 
emerging markets have much lower correlations with the world market port- 
folio than developed economies. For 1990-95,  the average correlation for the 
emerging markets is .22, which is still close to half  the correlation for the 
whole sample. There is therefore an increase in correlations of emerging mar- 
kets, but correlations among developed markets increased proportionally by 
roughly the same amount. In an interesting paper, DeSantis (1993) looked at 
the correlations of  markets in the World Bank's  emerging markets database 
over two periods. The first period was  1976-84  and the second 1984-92.  He 
found that the average correlation is essentially the same for these two subpe- 
riods. Looking at the correlation of the United States with these markets, he 
found a slight increase. The average is a trivial .038 for the first subperiod and 
,132 for the second subperiod. The second subperiod contains the crash of 
1987, however. Again, this evidence suggests a slight increase in correlations, 
but the increase seems slight enough that some might conclude there is no 
change. In a recent study, Bekaert and Harvey (1999) estimated a model that 
allows correlations between emerging markets and the world market to change 
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of seventeen emerging markets, they found the correlation with the world mar- 
ket to be higher for nine markets. This result seems to provide, at best, weak 
evidence that correlations increase after liberalization. We  discuss below the 
increase in correlations during crisis periods. Adding the past two years, which 
correspond to a crisis period, to the samples of  the studies discussed here 
would lead to higher correlation estimates. 
Though there is little evidence of strong increases in equity return correla- 
tions before the Asian crisis, there is evidence of dramatic increases in correla- 
tions between bond yields. Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau (1994) provided 
correlations between ten-year yields in the seven largest developed economies 
and the U.S. ten-year bond yield. For the period 1970-79, the average monthly 
correlation excluding Canada is .41. This average correlation increases to .86 
from 1980 to 1989 and to .88 from 1990 to 1994. Ilmanen (1995) showed evi- 
dence that there is a strong common factor in interest rate movements across de- 
veloped countries. One view of this increase in correlations is that, as markets 
become more integrated, investors give little room to monetary authorities to 
pursue policies that lead to sharply divergent interest rate movements. It is 
unclear, however, why the growing integration of markets would affect nomi- 
nal yields rather than expected real yields. 
Is There Causation? 
Many papers have been written trying to determine whether stock price 
changes in one market lead to stock price changes in another market. Initially, 
this research used monthly or weekly data. However, it quickly became appar- 
ent that such research is difficult to interpret. If prices adjust very quickly, there 
is little hope of  finding relationships using infrequently measured data. If  a 
shock to U.S. prices is transmitted to the rest of the world within twenty-four 
hours, this transmission is obscured by using monthly data. Weekly or monthly 
data might also yield spurious effects. Not all stocks trade frequently. Infre- 
quent trading of  some stocks can give the impression that one market leads 
another. To see this, suppose that the U.S. stock market drops by  20 percent 
during one month and one looks at whether this knowledge helps explain the 
return on foreign markets the following month. One would expect foreign 
stocks to fall contemporaneously to the extent that the U.S. stock market drop 
is brought about by some adverse event that affects the whole world. For in- 
stance, there could be bad news about the U.S. economy, which would reduce 
equity values throughout the world to some extent since firms would not be 
able to sell as much to the United States as expected. However, if some foreign 
stocks trade infrequently, the effect of bad news on their prices will be recorded 
only when they trade. Hence, if  some foreign stocks do not trade when bad 
news occurs, they will record a drop subsequent to the drop in the United 
States, leading to the wrong impression that the U.S. drop caused the drop 
abroad, when in fact both drops were caused by the same bad news. 
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led to the use of data of much higher frequency. Some of this research focuses 
on returns for periods when stock markets are open and periods when they are 
closed. Other research measures returns over even shorter periods of time. The 
opening hours for the U.S. and Japanese stock markets do not overlap. Over a 
twenty-four hour period, the Japanese market opens first and closes before the 
U.S. stock markets ever open. Japanese returns contain information about U.S. 
stock returns because the markets are correlated. A rough estimate is that a 10 
percent increase in Japanese markets on average corresponds to a 3 percent 
increase in U.S. markets. However, all the information contained in the Japa- 
nese return during trading hours should be incorporated in U.S. stock prices at 
the time that the market opens in the United States. This means that the 10 
percent Japanese market increase of our example should have no information 
about the U.S. market return during the US. trading day. The evidence is that 
most of the effect of the 10 percent Japanese market increase will be incorpo- 
rated in U.S. stock prices by the time the market opens. 
This research has also examined whether unexpected increases in volatility 
spill over across markets. The question asked is whether unexpectedly high 
volatility in the United States, when the U.S. market is open, leads to high 
volatility in Japan. This seems to be the case. It seems further that this effect 
is symmetric across the world: unexpected volatility in the United States leads 
to higher volatility in Japan, and unexpected volatility in Japan leads to higher 
volatility in the United States. One might be tempted to attribute this volatility 
spillover to the increased flow of capital and hence to the greater connections 
across markets. However, this literature finds greater evidence of spillovers in 
data before the crash of 1987 than after. One possible explanation is that many 
of the spillover effects documented  in the literature were spurious,  resulting from 
infrequent trading. There is substantial evidence that since the crash informa- 
tion has been incorporated in prices much faster, at least in the United States. 
The problem with both the return and the volatility evidence is that it is 
consistent with two hypotheses that have dramatically different implications 
for the efficiency of financial markets. One hypothesis is that the Japanese and 
U.S. markets have common components, and spillovers reflect these common 
components. Under this hypothesis, spillovers show that markets incorporate 
information efficiently. The second hypothesis is that spillovers are the work 
of uninformed investors who overreact to news in one market, corresponding 
to a change in ~entiment.~  They become more risk averse following bad news 
and less risk averse following good news, regardless of the fundamentals of 
their own market. With this view, there is contagion. The lack of spillover re- 
versals is evidence against the uninformed investor hypothesis. Lin and Ito 
(1994) devised an additional test that makes it possible to distinguish between 
the two hypotheses. They pointed out that uninformed traders who become 
9. De Long et al. (1990) developed a theory of  uninformed investors moved by sentiment and 
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more or less risk averse trade to change their portfolios. Consequently, strong 
spillovers should be associated with high volume. They found no  such evi- 
dence and argued that the evidence is more consistent with the view that mar- 
kets impound information efficiently. 
Contagion and Crises 
We  saw in the previous paragraph that there seems to be little evidence of 
contagion among developed markets under normal circumstances. However, 
we know that there are greater co-movements  in bear markets. This could mean 
that there is contagion when it might be most damaging, namely, in periods of 
turmoil. There has been much discussion of contagion among emerging mar- 
kets during the Mexican crisis and during the Asian crisis. Some have used this 
contagion to justify the help given to the Mexican government in 1994. For 
instance, Stanley Fischer states, “Of course, there was anotherjustification:  con- 
tagion effects. They were there and they were substantial” (quoted in Calvo, 
Goldstein, and Hochreiter 1997). Table 5.15 shows the performance of  some 
emerging markets during January 1995. During that period, the markets per- 
formed poorly. Further, as documented in Calvo and Reinhart (1997), correla- 
tions  among Latin American market  equities and  Brady  bonds  increased 
sharply around the crisis. Many have interpreted this as evidence of a contagion 
effect of  the Mexican crisis. The view is that, as Mexico fell into its crisis, 
investors reassessed the prospects of emerging markets and grew pessimistic 
Table 5.15  Returns on Major Emerging Market Indexes during January 1995 
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even when there was  no basis to do so. Flows to emerging markets slowed 
markedly immediately after the Mexican crisis, so that some have argued that 
this slowing was responsible for price drops. In the remainder of this section, 
we first discuss the economics of contagion and then examine some empirical 
evidence of the economic importance of contagion associated with the Mexi- 
can and Asian crises. 
The traditional view of contagion has to do with banking panics. The idea 
is that a bank fails and depositors start withdrawing funds from other banks 
that are healthy, thereby weakening these banks. For emerging markets, the 
reasoning is similar, namely, that a shock in one market leads investors to with- 
draw funds from other markets because of irrational fears. It is certainly the 
case that some investors behaved that way. Stories of specific investors making 
obvious mistakes in their analysis of  emerging markets have been repeated 
often.'O Though such stories enliven conferences, they are irrelevant to an as- 
sessment of contagion. Market prices are the product of the actions of all inves- 
tors, and the important question is whether aggregate outcomes are efficient. 
One would expect other investors to take advantage of the opportunities cre- 
ated by investors who panic. Hence, if there is plenty of arbitrage capital, con- 
tagion should not be a problem. 
Unfortunately, the investment industry is organized in such a way that arbi- 
trage capital to be used to take advantage of mispricings in emerging markets 
may be artificially scarce. Most investments in emerging markets are made by 
institutional investors. Typically, these investments are made because sponsors 
and clients designate emerging markets as an asset class in which they want 
to put funds. The investment industry responds to the demand for investment 
vehicles in an asset class by creating mutual funds and other investment vehi- 
cles. Consider now how institutional investors can react to lower stock prices 
brought about by panic selling from uninformed investors. Institutional inves- 
tors who are not specialized in the emerging market asset class will find it 
difficult to suddenly start investing in emerging markets to take advantage of 
investment opportunities created by panicky investors. Institutional investors 
who are specialized in the asset class face a situation where their resources are 
weakened by  the adverse shock that starts the contagion process and where 
they may find it difficult to liquidate assets to generate cash to exploit advanta- 
geous investment opportunities because of  turmoil in the markets. Conse- 
quently, few institutional investors may be able to take advantage of the invest- 
ment opportunities created by  the actions of  the uninformed investors. This 
lack of  arbitrage capital creates a situation where valuations depend on the 
capital committed to an asset class and can create discrepancies between valua- 
tions across asset classes. For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1997) showed 
that valuations in the venture capital industry depend on the funds committed 
to the industry. 
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Institutional investors specialized in emerging markets face an  additional 
problem that further limits their ability to take advantage of investment oppor- 
tunities during periods of  turmoil, namely, withdrawals of  funds by  clients. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) cogently argued that clients of institutional inves- 
tors may not be able to easily assess whether an investment strategy is right 
and may therefore use short-term returns to guide their investment decisions. 
For instance, it may be quite difficult for the typical pension fund organization 
to assess the performance of  an asset manager specialized in  emerging mar- 
kets. The manager may  have a solid economic argument that explains why 
current valuations are too low  and the best solution is to keep the portfolio 
unchanged. However, the client may find it difficult to assess whether this argu- 
ment is correct and may simply change her allocation of funds to the manager 
based on his recent performance. Consequently, an institutional investor who 
thinks that stock prices are too low in a particular country may not be able to 
act on his judgment if his portfolio has done poorly because funds are being 
withdrawn. In fact, institutional investors may be forced by circumstances to 
aggravate the contagion rather than exploit it. Facing redemptions, they may 
have to liquidate assets in healthy countries because those markets are liquid 
and may therefore adversely affect capital flows in these countries. What cre- 
ates the contagion in this case, however, is not an excess of  speculative capi- 
tal. Rather, it is that an insufficient amount of arbitrage capital is devoted to 
an asset class. The contagion arises because of a lack of investors who can pro- 
vide liquidity to the institutional investors forced to withdraw from a country. 
Hence, leaders of emerging countries should not complain about the actions of 
hedge fund managers but rather should complain that there are too few hedge 
funds. As more institutional investors become authorized to shift funds be- 
tween developed and emerging markets and across emerging markets, the pos- 
sibility of contagion induced by forced liquidations of some institutional inves- 
tors should disappear. 
Contagion caused by  panicky  investors  and  forced  liquidations is  self- 
limiting in equity markets. As prices fall, it becomes more advantageous to 
hold on to an investment rather than liquidate it. However, in debt markets, the 
situation is more delicate for those who rely on short-term debt. If  investors 
are reluctant to roll the debt over, promising higher yields may not solve the 
problem because these higher yields may imply too high a probability of de- 
fault. As a result, a country or a firm might face a liquidity crisis and be forced 
to decrease investment because it was cut off from public markets. Obviously, 
firms and countries that find themselves in such situations chose an imprudent 
financing policy. Financing with short-term debt amounts to betting that one’s 
credit will not deteriorate. Sometimes it does. When it does, those that finance 
with short-term debt face problems whether the change in the perception of 
credit quality is driven by contagion or not. If  the change in credit quality is 
driven by poor economic prospects for a firm or a country, it should contract 
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appropriate. Unfortunately, contagion can lead to costly liquidation of invest- 
ments that represents a waste of resources. 
When there are few creditors, they can get together and realize that the ap- 
propriate solution to a liquidity crisis is to restructure the debt. By doing this, 
the creditors make it more likely that they will be paid back. When the number 
of creditors is large, this coordination is no longer possible. A provider of li- 
quidity of  last resort can solve the problem by  providing temporary loans. 
However, the existence of such a provider may lead to the problem in the first 
place. In the absence of such a provider, different funding strategies would be 
used to reduce the risk of a liquidity crisis. The existence of a provider of li- 
quidity of last resort may also aggravate contagion. Presumably, the provider 
has limited resources; if these resources are deployed to help one country, they 
are not available to other countries. Consequently, a crisis in one country re- 
duces the credit of other countries that might need the help of the provider of 
liquidity of last resort. 
Empirical evidence derived by  Calvo and Reinhart (1997) shows that the 
capital accounts of developing economies are negatively related to the U.S. ex 
post real rate of  interest. This shows that there is a common factor in these 
capital accounts. The existence of  common factors is not, however, evidence 
of irrational contagion. In the absence of a careful model that shows what the 
capital accounts of  these economies would be in the absence of  contagion, 
there is no way that correlations among capital accounts caused by  the exis- 
tence of common factors can be attributed to contagion. For instance, histori- 
cally the U.S. stock market increases when interest rates fall. It could be per- 
fectly rational for U.S.  investors to invest more in developing economies when 
their wealth increases. 
Contagion does not require changes in capital flows to sharply decrease the 
value of financial assets. This is because public information affects stock prices 
without trades in stocks. To see this, consider the Mexican crisis. All investors 
could observe the events taking place. When an adverse event has taken place, 
investors will not buy stocks at the prices prevailing before the event. On aver- 
age, one would expect the price of the first trade taking place after the event to 
incorporate the information revealed by  the event. At  the very least, equity 
prices would reflect the event very quickly, and there is no reason for massive 
sales to take place for equity prices to reach their new value. If  the stock price 
adjustment process is quick, it is very difficult to find evidence that information 
in one country caused markets in other countries to change value irrespective 
of fundamentals by  trying to show that the change in one country preceded 
the other. 
The literature often defines contagion to  be  an  increase in  correlations 
among country indexes in periods of crisis. The reasoning is that correlations 
among country indexes in noncrisis periods reflect fundamentals, so that if 
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bon (1998) showed why this reasoning is wrong. Correlations among security 
returns naturally increase when the volatility of  a common factor that influ- 
ences stock returns increases. For instance, if country indexes are related to 
the world market index, an increase in the volatility of the world market index 
implies that country indexes become more correlated with the world market 
index. Hence, comparing correlations among indexes for periods of different 
volatility would necessarily lead to the result that correlations are higher when 
volatility is higher. Consequently, higher correlations during crisis periods 
do not mean contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (1998) estimated correlation in- 
creases during the Mexican and Asian crises taking into account the natural 
increase in correlations during periods of high volatility. Using traditional esti- 
mates of correlations, they found that the correlation between Hong Kong and 
Australia was .356 during a period of stability and 365  during the Asian crisis 
period. The increase in correlation is statistically significant. Adjusting for the 
impact of the increase in volatility, they found the correlation during the crisis 
period between Hong Kong and Australia to be .561 rather than 365, and the 
correlation increase is not statistically significant. Looking at many countries, 
they found the same pattern, namely, statistically significant contagion when 
the estimate of the correlation increase ignores the impact of the volatility in- 
crease and statistically insignificant contagion otherwise. They found similar 
results looking at the Mexican crisis. For instance, the correlation between Mex- 
ico and Argentina was  .382 during a period of stability and 359 during the 
crisis period when one ignores the impact of the increase in volatility. However, 
taking into account the impact of the increase in volatility, the correlation dur- 
ing the crisis period was SO0 and is not significantly greater than the correla- 
tion during the period of stability. The analysis of Forbes and Rigobon showed 
that one cannot argue that the increases in correlations observed during crisis 
periods are evidence of contagion. 
Using daily stock returns does not provide statistically significant evidence 
of contagion. Often, higher frequency data lead to more powerful tests. A re- 
cent study by  Bailey, Chan, and Chung (1997) investigated the relation be- 
tween changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate at half-hourly intervals from 21 
December 1994 to 30 April 1995 and the returns of Asian and Latin American 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the NYSE and country funds on the 
same exchange. They estimated the relation between the half-hour change in a 
stock and the contemporaneous change in the peso exchange rate as well as 
the change in the previous half-hour. Not surprisingly, they found a strong con- 
temporaneous relation between the Mexican ADRs and the peso exchange rate, 
as well as a strong lagged relationship. However, they also found that a depre- 
ciation of the peso during a half-hour has a significant adverse effect on non- 
Mexican Latin American ADRs for the same period as well as for the next 
period. Essentially, a 1 percent depreciation of the peso is associated with a 
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There is no effect on Asian ADRs. Looking at closed-end funds, they found a 
small but significant effect of peso depreciation on Asian country funds and a 
stronger effect on non-Mexican Latin-American country funds. A 1 percent 
depreciation of the peso is estimated to reduce the value of Asian country funds 
by 0.03 percent and the value of non-Mexican Latin American country funds 
by  0.18 percent. They also explored the impact of the intensity of news an- 
nouncements on the volatility of ADRs and country funds. Again, they found 
that non-Mexican Latin American ADRs and country funds experience larger 
absolute returns when there is news about Mexico during a half-hour. 
The findings of Bailey et al. (1997) provide evidence of a tequila effect on 
the NYSE. Unfortunately, the paper did not attempt to assess how much of the 
effect is due to information effects and how much is explained by the panic of 
uninformed investors. Lin and It0 (1994) argued that contagion associated with 
stock price decreases implies that high correlations are associated with high 
volume because uninformed investors liquidate their positions. Bailey et al. 
(1997) provided evidence that can be used to check whether contagion due to 
uninformed investors was important. They showed that news about the Mexi- 
can peso and other Mexican news had a strong effect on the volume of Mexi- 
can ADRs and closed-end funds. However, the same news had little effect on 
the volume of non-Mexican ADRs and closed-end funds, whether they were 
Latin American or Asian. From 21 December 1994 to 30 April 1995, Mexican 
news explained 5 percent of the variation in Mexican ADR volume and 9 per- 
cent in Mexican closed-end funds volume. In contrast, it explained nothing of 
the variation in Asian ADR or closed-end fund volume. For Latin American 
ADR and closed-end funds, Mexican news explained 1.1 percent of the varia- 
tion in the volume of closed-end funds and 0.3 percent of the variation in vol- 
ume of ADRs. Though it may be that using different measurement intervals 
would lead to different conclusions, this evidence is more supportive of  the 
view that Mexican events provided useful information to markets rather than 
the view that a stampede of uninformed investors harmed valuations by sudden 
excessive cautiousness. 
Another way  to consider the economic importance of  contagion was pro- 
vided by Sachs et al. (1996). They examined the reaction of twenty emerging 
countries to the Mexican crisis. They argued that countries that suffered sig- 
nificantly from the tequila effect were weak to start with, in that they suffered 
simultaneously from a weak banking sector, an overvalued currency, and low 
reserves. In such countries, withdrawals of  capital by  foreign investors ad- 
versely affected the currency and endangered the banking sector as the value of 
foreign-currency-denominated  liabilities increased in domestic currency. They 
argued that in the countries that did not suffer from these problems, the “Te- 
quila effect left no hangover” (Sachs et al. 1996, 193). They found, however, 
no additional explanatory power in the magnitude and composition of capital 
flows before the crisis. In other words, large net portfolio flows did not make 
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5.2.3  Flows and Asset Returns 
In section 5.2.1 we saw that liberalization increases valuations and decreases 
the cost of capital. In section 5.2.2  we saw that there is little evidence of large 
increases in cross-country co-movements with liberalization and that, while 
co-movements are larger in bear markets, it is quite difficult to distinguish 
contagion effects from information effects based on evidence from stock re- 
turns. In this section, we address the issue of  whether changes in valuations 
can be traced directly to flows. In other words, we try to understand how an ad- 
ditional dollar of flow affects valuations. This issue is at the heart of the con- 
cern of whether flows can push up equity prices irrationally only to bring them 
crashing when foreign capital withdraws unexpectedly. In this view, flows in- 
crease prices when they come in and decrease them when they leave. Further, 
they make prices more volatile because they come and go on a whim. From 
reading some commentators, it would seem that there is little debate about this 
issue. For instance, Dornbusch and Park argued that “there is ample evidence 
that financial market opening is likely to increase the volatility of asset prices” 
(1995,39). The mechanism they had in mind is that foreign investors buy more 
as prices go up, engaging in what is called positive feedback trading. As they 
do this, prices keep increasing. Further, they also argued that the interest of 
foreign investors makes markets more liquid, thereby facilitating speculative 
trades. 
A long tradition in  financial economics argues that demand and supply 
shocks that do not convey information about fundamentals are unimportant. 
This tradition got its start with Scholes (1972). He showed very carefully that 
sales of large blocks of stocks have a negligible impact on the stock price when 
these trades are made purely for liquidity reasons. The reason is straightfor- 
ward. If  the equity of  an individual firm becomes underpriced, investors can 
make money by buying it. Similarly, if  equity is overpriced, those who own 
that equity can make money by selling it. Trades undertaken purely for liquid- 
ity reasons provide no information about the value of the equity for investors 
and hence do not change investors’ assessment of  the value of  the equity. If 
investors suspect that a large trade is undertaken on the basis of  information 
about the firm, then the large trade will naturally have an impact on the value 
of the equity as buyers will only buy at a price that protects them from the 
adverse information the seller has. In this view, the demand for securities is 
perfectly elastic at given prices as long as information about the securities does 
not change. This view implies that capital inflows or outflows have an impact 
on valuations only if they are undertaken because of information that foreign 
investors have that is not yet incorporated in prices. 
Are there any reasons to suspect that foreign investors at times are better 
informed than domestic investors? This seems unlikely. As already mentioned, 
it is well known that investors do not take advantage of international diversifi- 
cation as much as simple models would suggest. There are many possible ex- 282  Rene M. Stub 
planations for this phenomenon, but a leading one is that investors are less well 
informed about foreign securities than about securities of  their own country. 
They are therefore concerned that when they buy equity from foreign investors, 
they buy the equity that foreign investors believe to be overvalued. A natural 
protection for investors who diversify internationally is therefore to invest in 
firms for which information is more easily available. Typically, large firms are 
the ones for which most information is available. 
Unfortunately, data are lacking to test the hypothesis that foreign investors 
favor large firms. Japan seems to be the only country where data on holdings 
of equity by foreign investors are easily available at the firm level. Kang and 
Stulz (1997) demonstrated that foreign investors have a considerable bias to- 
ward large firm stocks in Japan. Dividing Japanese firms each year into five 
groups according to firm size, they found that foreign ownership in the smallest 
firms is 1.8 percent on average from 1975 to 1991; in contrast, ownership in 
the largest firms is 7.66 percent. This large difference in ownership between 
small and large firms is not completely attributable to the decrease in the infor- 
mation advantage of local investors as firm size increases. Most international in- 
vestment is done by institutional investors. As reported by Falkenstein (1 996), 
institutional  investors prefer shares of large firms. These shares have lower 
transaction costs, are more liquid, and enable investors to make larger trades 
without affecting share prices. The overall preference of foreign investors for 
large firms suggests that large firms should have a lower cost of capital. For 
the case of Japan, Kang and Stulz (1997) found weak evidence that shares in 
which foreign investment is large have lower average returns. 
The Mexican crisis offers another piece of evidence that foreign investors 
are at an information disadvantage. Whereas some have blamed foreign inves- 
tors for Mexico’s troubles, careful examination reveals quite a different story. 
Capital outflows from residents took place throughout 1994, following the as- 
sassination of the presidential candidate Colosio on 23 March 1994. In con- 
trast, foreign investors were net buyers of Mexican equity even in December 
1994. 
Frankel and Schmukler (1996) found an interesting way to look at this issue. 
They investigated the returns of Mexican closed-end funds that trade in the 
United States. A closed-end fund typically trades at a price that differs from the 
value of the portfolio that it represents. The value of the underlying portfolio is 
called the net asset value (NAV) of  the fund. Frankel and Schmukler (1996) 
reasoned that the price of a fund moves because of its U.S. investors whereas 
the NAV moves because of Mexican investors since the underlying portfolio is 
a portfolio of Mexican stocks that trade in Mexico City. They found that the 
NAV moves before the price of the fund and causes changes in the price of the 
fund. Their interpretation was that Mexico City moves Wall Street’s assessment 
of Mexican stocks rather than the reverse. 
If foreign investors are less well informed than domestic investors, they will 
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lic announcements are less likely to be news to domestic investors because 
they are insiders. Second, since foreign investors are less well informed, their 
assessment of a country is less precise and hence can be altered more by public 
information. This makes capital flows sensitive to news. Brennan and Cao 
(1997) modeled this phenomenon and provide supporting evidence. Note that 
this sensitivity to news implies behavior that is not too dissimilar to that dis- 
cussed by Dornbusch and Park (1995). If  investors react to news strongly, they 
buy when stock prices are increasing and sell when stock prices are falling. 
This makes capital flows correlated with contemporaneous returns. However, 
there seems to be no clear evidence in Brennan and Cao (1997) that investors 
practice a positive feedback trading strategy in that there is no evidence that 
high returns are followed by high flows rather than accompanied by high flows. 
Tesar and Werner (1993) also looked at the issue of the determinants of equity 
portfolio flows. Unfortunately, they only reported correlations. Nevertheless, 
their data set also provides evidence of a positive contemporaneous correlation 
between returns and flows for most Latin American countries and some Asian 
countries. 
Several recent studies examined whether foreign investors are positive feed- 
back traders, namely, whether they buy following positive returns and sell fol- 
lowing negative returns. Bohn and Tesar (1996) found evidence of  positive 
feedback trading using monthly data for a large number of  countries. Using 
daily data of  trades from the investors who use State Street Bank & Trust as 
their custodian, Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes concluded that “there is very 
strong trend following in international inflows. The majority of the co-move- 
ment of flows and returns at quarterly intervals is actually due to returns pre- 
dicting future flows” (1998, 18). Using data from Korea, Choe, Kho, and Stulz 
(1999) found strong evidence of positive feedback trading among foreign in- 
vestors in that country in 1997. Surprisingly, however, the evidence of positive 
feedback trading is weak for the last three months of  1997 when the Asian 
crisis hit Korea. It seems implausible therefore that the trading practices of 
foreign investors had much impact on the crisis. Perhaps more important, posi- 
tive feedback trading need not be destabilizing. For instance, if  markets are 
slow to incorporate information into stock prices, positive returns can be ex- 
pected to be followed by  positive returns. Consequently, positive feedback 
trading is profitable, but investors who trade that way make markets more effi- 
cient rather than destabilizing them since they accelerate the incorporation of 
information into prices. 
If  domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors, they will 
hold more domestic shares on average. The reason is that foreign investors 
discount share prices relative to domestic investors since domestic investors 
tend to sell if  they have adverse information that is not incorporated in asset 
prices. This means that foreign investors do not take as much advantage of 
international diversification as they would if  all investors had the same infor- 
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the cost of  capital in the domestic country is higher than it would be in the 
absence of these asymmetries because domestic investors bear more risk. As 
flows leave the country because of bad news, equity prices fall because domes- 
tic investors have to hold more domestic shares. Inflows have the opposite ef- 
fect. This means that in such a model flows have an impact on the cost of 
capital. It is also the case that information asymmetries between domestic and 
foreign investors increase equity return volatility. There is no reason for flows 
induced by  new information to be destabilizing. As information is revealed, 
investors change their holdings, which has a permanent effect on prices. 
When shares are sold by domestic investors to foreign investors, the shares 
become held by  investors who are internationally diversified and who do not 
view  domestic shares to be as risky  as domestic investors do. Unexpected 
changes in investor composition affect equity prices for two reasons, one per- 
manent and one transitory. The permanent reason is the one discussed in the 
previous paragraph, namely, that investors requiring a lower risk premium buy 
the shares. As foreign investors come to the domestic country, however, there 
might also be a transitory effect, which is that as they seek to buy the securities, 
they have to offer domestic investors an inducement so that they will sell. This 
compensation only affects prices in the short run, and its size depends on the 
liquidity of the markets. In very liquid markets, the compensation is trivial. As 
markets become less liquid, it might be substantial. This liquidity compensa- 
tion has to be paid by investors who seek to buy, as well as by investors who 
seek to sell. If an investor wants to get out of a country quickly, she has to offer 
a discount on the shares she wishes to sell. As shown by Campbell, Grossman, 
and Wang (1993), this liquidity compensation creates reversals in stock prices. 
When a large group of investors wants to get out of  stocks in a market, they 
have to provide compensation to buyers of their shares in the form of a larger 
short-term return. Buyers can only obtain this return by buying the shares at a 
temporarily low price. There is evidence for the United States that such an 
effect exists, but there is also evidence that it becomes much weaker over time 
as markets become more efficient." 
This liquidity compensation is a cost that investors pay to trade and it affects 
their trading strategies. In the extreme case, an illiquid market has a lock-in 
effect: the discount to be paid to get out is too high and therefore investors do 
not sell and ride out the bad times. Illiquidity can also keep investors out, how- 
ever. Not surprisingly, international investors tend to hold securities for which 
this liquidity compensation is small, namely, securities of large firms. Though 
some have argued that liquid markets promote short-term horizons on the part 
of investors, which hurt economies, going even so far as to argue that the liquid 
markets of the United States were a source of competitive disadvantage for the 
11. Froot and Perold (1995) documented that the short-term behavior of stock prices is different 
in recent years from what it has been historically. Yesterday's stock returns have much less informa- 
tion about tomorrow's  stock returns than they used to. Gagnon and Karoiyi (1997) showed that the 
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United States, it is important to remember that liquid markets facilitate pur- 
chases by investors. Investors who cannot sell in a country have no incentive 
to invest in that country. 
We  now look at the evidence of the impact of flows on returns. There is a 
paucity of empirical evidence at this point. Part of the reason for this is that 
good data on international flows are hard to find. Before turning to the interna- 
tional evidence, we first consider some evidence for the United States that uses 
high-quality data. 
There is clear evidence from the United States that changes in the composi- 
tion of investors can have a direct impact on the value of equity. Over the past 
twenty years, indexing has become tremendously important and the index cho- 
sen most often for index portfolios is the S&P 500. Consequently, when a stock 
joins the S&P 500, this immediately creates a demand for that stock from in- 
dexers. Standard and Poor’s adds stocks to the S&P 500 based on public infor- 
mation, so that the fact that a stock is added to the S&P 500 does not reveal 
information about the true value of the stock. Further, indexers have to buy the 
stock irrespective of its price on the date that it joins the S&P 500. This means 
that no information is conveyed by  the increased demand for the stock. Ac- 
cording to the traditional finance model, there should be no price impact when 
a stock  joins the S&P 500. Yet there is such a price impact. Shleifer (1986) and 
Harris and Gurel(l986) estimated this impact at 3 to 4 percent. Further, all the 
evidence suggests that this impact is permanent, corresponding to a decrease 
in the cost of capital for firms that join the S&P 500. The most sensible expla- 
nation for this effect is that the demand for the stock has increased. Existing 
investors in the stock do not have a perfect substitute for the stock that they are 
giving up if they sell, so that the total demand for the stock increases. 
Adding a stock to the S&P 500 probably does not affect the overall demand 
for stocks, Rather, the existing demand gets redistributed across stocks and this 
redistribution has a price effect. One might argue that such an example un- 
derstates the importance of changes in demand and that the situation of emerg- 
ing markets facing an inflow of  capital is more akin to what happens when 
new mutual fund money flows into the U.S. stock market. An inflow of mutual 
fund money is mostly money that was not invested in the stock market. In an 
interesting recent study, Warther (1995) argued that the impact of  an unex- 
pected flow of mutual fund money to the U.S. stock market is rather consider- 
able. His estimates were that a 1 percent increase in mutual fund stock assets, 
which for his sample period corresponds to an inflow in the stock market of 
$4.57 billion, brings about an increase of 5.7 percent in stock prices. His con- 
cern was naturally whether this is a reversible price impact due to liquidity or 
a permanent price impact. Though he looked hard to find reversals, he was not 
successful. It appears that this effect is permanent. A plausible explanation is 
that a broadening of the shareholder base lowers the risk premium as risks are 
spread across more investors. 
Flows move prices. One would expect this to be the case if the risk of stocks 286  Ren6 M. Stulz 
becomes spread across more investors. The alternative explanation is that flows 
move prices because they drive stock prices away from fundamentals. As inves- 
tors flow into a market, they push prices up without regard for fundamentals, 
driven by  some kind of  feeding frenzy. Eventually, prices collapse. Clark and 
Berko (1996) attempted to distinguish between these two views in the case of 
Mexico. Mexico saw a dramatic increase in foreign ownership during their 
sample period. From 1989 to the end of  1993, foreign ownership of Mexican 
equities increased from a trivial amount to more than one-fourth of the Mexi- 
can market capitalization. Like Warther (1995), they found a strong effect of 
flows on returns. Their estimate was that an unexpected inflow equal to 1 per- 
cent of the capital of the market leads to a contemporaneous increase of 13 per- 
cent in prices. This estimate was actually smaller than Warther’s (1995). They 
found no evidence of  price reversals, suggesting that the impact of  flows is 
permanent rather than transitory and cannot be explained by  price pressure. 
They also found no support for the hypothesis of  positive feedback trading. 
Therefore, their evidence is fully supportive of the investor base broadening 
hypothesis. 
In an article discussing the difficulties of some Asian emerging markets, an 
economist at J. P.  Morgan was quoted in the New York Times as saying: “One 
wishes the markets were less fickle.” It could indeed be that flows have a per- 
manent effect on prices but they are so volatile and fickle that, by coming and 
going, they keep inflicting shocks on  prices. This is the concern often ex- 
pressed about portfolio flows, that somehow equity investments are the wrong 
kind of  investments for a country because they can leave a country rapidly. 
This view seems rather perverse in that, in the absence of  contracting costs, 
there would be little reason to have direct foreign investment and all foreign 
investment would be portfolio investment. This suggests that portfolio invest- 
ment is a more advanced and more efficient form of international investment. 
However, there are many ways to obtain financing through sales of securities. 
The risk of  financing through short-term debt is that one might not like the 
conditions at which the debt can be refinanced. Portfolio flows should not be 
blamed when a country or a firm has chosen a financing strategy that leaves it 
exposed to refinancing risks. 
Though well established, the view that portfolio investment is more fickle 
than other forms of investment seems to have little empirical basis. In a useful 
study, Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1993) investigated the volatility of for- 
eign direct investment, portfolio equity flows, long-term flows, and short-term 
flows for five developed economies and five developing countries. They also 
broke down flows by transactors, namely, foreign direct investors, banks, gov- 
ernments, and the private sector. The developing countries in their sample were 
Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Argentina, and Brazil. In all cases, 
they focused on net flows. Their results are surprising in light of the comments 
about fickle equity flows. They found no support for the notion that equity 
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found that the label of flows provides no information about how they behave 
over time. Their conclusion was that “if presented with one time-series (statis- 
tics) only, one will likely be unable to tell the label of the flow” (Claessens et 
al. 1993, 26). 
Liberalization opens the door to capital flows. These flows affect security 
prices. Another implication of the hypothesis that portfolio flows are exces- 
sively volatile is that portfolio flows increase the volatility of security returns. 
The risk-sharing hypothesis that predicts a decrease in the cost of capital sug- 
gests that opening up a country could well decrease the volatility of its security 
returns. Consider the example of our closed economy that has a comparative 
advantage in producing coffee beans. An adverse event that decreases the value 
of the coffee crop makes the country poorer. Suppose that poorer investors are 
more reluctant to bear risk. In this case, the adverse shock increases the risk 
premium and hence decreases stock prices even further. If this economy is an 
open economy, the adverse shock will be spread across investors throughout 
the world and hence will have only a trivial effect on the risk premium. With 
this analysis, opening up the economy decreases volatility. However, opening 
up the economy means that the risk premium on the coffee bean industry now 
depends on worldwide factors, so that shocks to the world risk premium affect 
the value of the coffee bean industry. If one thinks that risk premiums should be 
fairly stable on world markets, then opening up a country decreases volatility if 
investors who have become poorer are less willing to bear risk. 
Let’s consider the empirical evidence on volatility and liberalization.  A num- 
ber of different authors have examined this issue, using different approaches. 
Kim and Singal (1993) considered changes in volatility around liberalizations 
for a sample of sixteen emerging markets. In their study, they found that vola- 
tility in the first twelve months following a liberalization is not significantly 
different from volatility in the previous twelve months. However, they also 
found that after the first twelve months, volatility falls significantly on average. 
They provided other evidence that is consistent with an increase in volatility 
for some countries and no effect for most countries. Interestingly, the countries 
for which they found large significant increases were Argentina, Chile, and 
Mexico. Richards estimated volatility for emerging markets using weekly data 
and concluded that “the period 1992-1995, which saw foreign institutional in- 
vestors playing a more significant role in emerging markets has been character- 
ized by  volatility that is marginally lower than the remainder of  the sample 
period (1975 to 1992)” (1996,473). His result is surprising in that it covers the 
period of  the Mexican crisis. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) considered twenty 
emerging markets and examined stock return volatility before and after liberal- 
ization. Using a variety of approaches, they found in all cases that on average 
liberalization decreases volatility. The bottom line from these studies is that 
the claim that liberalization increases volatility is not supported by  empirical 
evidence. 
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Mei (1996) did this for the case of Japan using monthly data on equity pur- 
chases and sales by foreign investors. Foreign portfolio equity investment in Ja- 
pan has been small over the past twenty years, peaking in 1984 at 10.31 percent 
but falling back to less than 5 percent in 1990. This means that evidence for 
Japan has to be viewed with caution on this issue. Nevertheless, they found 
that trades by foreign investors do not differ in impact on volatility from trades 
by other investors. 
Folkerts-Landau and Ito (1 995) computed volatility of emerging markets for 
periods that differ in the intensity of portfolio flows. Table 5.16 summarizes 
their evidence. They also showed evidence on the issue of  whether a day  of 
high volatility for the Dow Jones predicts high volatility the next day in an 
emerging market for periods where the nature of  flows differ. Overall, their 
evidence is rather mixed. Mexican stock prices appear to be the least volatile 
when flows are most volatile. In contrast, however, the Hong Kong stock return 
volatility is higher when flows are most volatile. There seems to be evidence 
that local volatility is more strongly linked to the volatility of  the Dow Jones 
in periods of more volatile flows. Models where foreign investors are less well 
informed than local investors and alter their holdings when they receive new 
information produce a positive relation between stock return volatility and flow 
volatility. However, in this case, this relation results mostly from flows and 
stock prices being driven by the same factors. The relation between flows and 
volatility would be a source of concern if  it were due to temporary increases 
and decreases in stock prices. It is often argued that such temporary increases 
and decreases in stock prices can be the result of herding by institutional inves- 
tors. The idea is that institutional investors behave alike, pouring in and out 
of stocks as a group. In the most detailed and careful study to date, Wermers 
(1998) investigated whether U.S. institutional investors herd and whether this 
behavior leads to temporary changes in stock prices. He found strong evidence 
of herding behavior, especially for smaller stocks. However, at the same time, 
he failed to find evidence that herding leads to temporary changes in stock 
prices. An increase in institutional ownership is associated with an increase in 
stock prices, but this increase appears to be permanent. 
In a detailed investigation of  the behavior of foreign investors in Korea in 
1997, Choe et al. (1999) found that there is evidence of herding among foreign 
investors. Their data included all trades on the Korea Stock Exchange for 1997. 
For each trade, they had information on whether a party to the trade was a 
foreign investor and the country of  origin of that investor. They showed that 
there is herding  among investors from different countries. Further, herding 
measures for investors from the United States, though upward biased because 
of  the nature of  the data, seem extremely high. Surprisingly, however, they 
found that herding measures were smaller during the last three months of 1997, 
when the Asian crisis hit Korea, than before. To investigate whether foreign 
investors have a destabilizing effect on prices, they estimated the impact on 
prices of large purchases and large sales by  foreign investors. They argued that 289  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
Table 5.16  Flows and Volatility of Stock Returns 
Country and Period 
Hong Kong 
Low inflow 
(Jan. 1988-Aug.  1991) 
High inflow 
(Sept. 1991-Oct.  1993) 
Volatile flow 
(Nov. 1993-J~ly  1994) 
Korea 
Low inflow 
(Jan. 1988-Dec.  1991) 
High inflow 
(Jan. 1992-June  1993) 
Volatile flow 
(July 1993-J~ly  1994) 
Thailand 
Volatile flow 
(Jan. 1988-Apr.  1991) 
Moderate inflow 
(May 1991-Oct.  1992) 
High flow 
(July 1993-July  1994) 
Low inflow 
(Jan. 1988-Apr.  1990) 
Volatile flow 
(May 1990-Jan.  1993) 
More steady inflow 




Local Volatility  Return and 
Volatility of  Divided by  Previous-Day Dow 
Daily  Volatility of  Jones Squared 
Returns  Dow Jones  Return 
1.61  1.52  0.068 
1.31  1.98  0.023 
2.33  3.68  0.150 
1.51  1.42  0.055 
1.18  2.55  0.029 
1.14  2.31  0.120 
1.19  1.74  0.296 
1.69  2.14  0.115 
1.17  2.66  0.103 
1.99  1.88  0.048 
1.57  1.76  0.324 
1.61  2.57  0.003 
Source: Constructed from tables 1.13 and 1.14 of Folkerts-Landau and It0 (1995). 
if foreign investors destabilize prices, they should start runs on prices. Instead, 
most of the price impact of trades by foreign investors is incorporated in prices 
within ten minutes and nothing else happens following trades by  foreign in- 
vestors. In other words, there is no evidence that foreign investors start runs 
on prices. Roughly, the impact of large trades by foreign investors in Korea is 
no different from the impact of  large trades by institutional investors on the 
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5.2.4  Conclusions 
The empirical evidence shows that international portfolio flows have a bene- 
ficial effect on countries that liberalize, by  decreasing the cost of  capital in 
these countries and enabling residents to share risks with other investors. Port- 
folio inflows seem to have permanent positive effects on valuations. There is 
no strong empirical support for the view that portfolio flows increase the vola- 
tility of security returns or otherwise adversely affect the performance of eq- 
uity markets. In particular, there is little evidence that the opening of countries 
has led to substantial increases in the co-movement of their stock markets with 
the world market. There is evidence that investors find information about one 
emerging market useful in their assessment of other emerging markets. How- 
ever, proponents of the view that there is extensive irrational contagion across 
emerging markets have yet to prove their case. 
Opening a country to portfolio flows makes the country better off by enabl- 
ing it to share risks with foreigners and to lower costs of capital for its indus- 
tries. It positions the country to receive more capital when the country’s invest- 
ment opportunities improve. The only way  a country can take advantage of 
these benefits is by understanding fully that in a market economy foreign inves- 
tors pursue the best investment opportunities available as they see them. They 
have strong incentives to identify all good investment opportunities carefully, 
because any opportunity they miss lowers the return on their portfolio. Their 
behavior makes investors as unlikely to be swept away by irrational contagion 
as to stay passive when governments try to maintain exchange rates and interest 
rates that are not sustainable. 
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3. Stephen Friedman 
These comments sketch out the following hypothesis: an important side effect 
of U.S. international equity flows is to assist in the development-and  much 
needed transformation, over time-of  the business and bureaucratic cultures 
underlying emerging country capital markets and economies. I will lay out my 
perceptions on this subject in the hope that you find them worth more rigorous 
and less anecdotal inquiry than I can bring to bear. For several reasons, my fo- 
cus will be on the effect of equity flows from the United States to emerging 
economies throughout the world.' One reason is that I am most familiar with 
1. Recent net equity market flows into the United States are relatively modest and not trans- 
forming in any conceptual sense. From 1990 through the first quarter of  1997, foreign net pur- 
chases of U.S.  equities totaled only $46  billion, against a U.S. market value of almost one-half the 
total world stock market capitalization. Non-U.S. investors do hold about 6.5 percent of all U.S. 
shares, but their activities usually have only a small impact on market direction. During the same 
period, aggregate net U.S. flows into the equity markets of  Latin America and Asia outside of 
Japan were about $78 billion-greater  both absolutely and relatively than flows into the United 
States since the funds went into markets whose cumulative capitalization was only about 7 percent 
of  the worlq total at midyear. 294  Stephen Friedman 
the US.  investor. More important, I want to concentrate on the present and po- 
tential transforming influence of U.S. equity outflows-which,  I believe, gives 
them a significance far greater than the quantity of dollars would suggest.* 
First, however, some general background on the accelerated globalization of 
U.S. equity portfolios in the past decade. The volume of US.-owned foreign 
shares is currently over $1 trillion, equal to roughly 6 percent of the US.  stock 
market capitalization, and these holdings are growing markedly faster than 
the value of domestic equities. Since the mid-l980s, these outflows have been 
evenly spread between industrialized countries and emerging markets, with 
flows to Asia and Latin America consistently positive. Demand has also gener- 
ated its own supply, and the size, sophistication, and competitiveness of US. 
equity markets has led to explosive growth in the number of issuers attracted 
to our market: 20 percent of U.S.-based equity demand during the past decade 
flowed to the emerging stock markets of Asia and Latin America.’ 
Without attempting to go far back in history, prior to the 1990s U.S. equity 
portfolio flows to emerging nations offered a rather straightforward bargain: 
they afforded to a relatively small investor base some diversification (with low 
correlation of  investment results to U.S. markets) plus acceptable returns- 
hopefully, higher returns than the S&P 500 to compensate for the increased 
volatility-in  turn, foreign recipients were provided with an additional source 
of long-term funds and lower capital costs. 
2. Equity portfolio flows from other advanced economies, particularly the United Kingdom 
(which, together with the United States, the French think of as the proponent of “Anglo-Saxon” 
style capitalism). would tend to have similar impacts. 
3. From an October 1997 presentation: “The Globalization of U.S. Equity Ownership” (by Eric 
Dobkin, the chairman of Goldman, Sachs worldwide equity capital markets group). Dobkin went 
on to identify some reasons for the ongoing expansion in U.S. ownership of foreign equities: 
1.  Demise of communism, reducing event risk 
2.  Globalization of world economies, with a correlation between necessary and growing open- 
ness of economies, economic growth, and capital Rows 
3.  Desire of U.S. savers to attain greater diversification into the slightly more than one-half the 
global market capitalization and 80 percent of world GDP lying outside the United States 
(pension fund and endowment advisors frequently support an allocation benchmark of 15 to 
20 percent of equity holdings in foreign shares) 
4.  Exposure to superior growth potential in certain emerging markets, albeit at the cost of 
greater sector volatility 
5. Returns generated from the emerging markets  not very correlated with the S&P 500 (or 
among themselves) thus dampening potential volatility in the entire portfolio 
6.  Increased familiarity: becoming “comfortable with those foreign companies that looked and 
smelt like U.S. companies [and] were subject to the same or similar accounting principles” 
7.  Technology: “the structure and flexibility of  the US. financing sector allows a more ef- 
fortless passing of the baton from venture capital financing to the stock market than is the 
case in much of Europe or Asia. [Ths has] allowed U.S.  investors to become early stage 
major shareholders in a number of foreign technology companies at a time when non-U.S. 
investors may not have felt entirely comfortable with the very  nascent state of these rev- 
enues” 
8.  Familiarity with restructuring: given the industry-by-industry wave of restructuring and con- 
solidation in the United States, and U.S. investors’ resulting positive experience, they have 
learned to identify candidates for consolidation, cost cutting, and rationalization abroad 295  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
I suggest that, as the absolute size and relative importance of these flows has 
increased, and a critical mass of  U.S. emerging nation investment has been 
reached, there has been a qualitative change in their impact. Analogous to the 
effect of open trade markets, sizable equity portfolio flows from advanced U.S. 
(and other “Anglo-Saxon” style) capital markets are accompanied by  influ- 
ential demands as to acceptable practices, by infectious cultural norms, and by 
role model and mentoring effects, which substantially affect the business cul- 
tures of recipient emerging countries and companies. This applies-albeit  im- 
perfectly-in  varying degrees whether the recipients are emerging nations in 
Latin America, Southeast Asia, Russia, or eastern Europe? In other words, as 
one influential investment banker summed it up: “If  [particular emerging na- 
tions and their enterprises] want to compete for the money, they’ll have to clean 
up their act.” 
In  a different context, Paul  Samuelson and William Nordhaus have dis- 
cussed “external economies” and noted that the return to a nation from new 
innovation can be a multiple of the reward collected by  the innovator. My cen- 
tral point is that, just as there is a very high “social return” to a nation from 
tangible, patentable invention, there can also be very high returns from the 
cultural transformation of  enterprise work practices and norms: motivating 
people to change the way they think and, most important, influencing attitudes 
toward the very process of ongoing change. 
This general principal is readily observable in action. For example, the 
transfer of “lean production” know-how from Japanese auto manufacturers and 
other industrial concerns to U.S. auto companies and other manufacturers- 
much of which accompanied Japanese direct investment in the United States- 
has been vastly beneficial to the United  state^.^ According to management, su- 
pervisors, unionists, and blue-collar workers in positively affected plants, the 
prerequisite to many of these successful innovations was not hard technologi- 
cal innovation but “softer,” cultural change: major shifts in attitude and rela- 
tionships needed to occur between and among senior management, suppliers, 
managers of functional staff “silos,” plant supervisors, and blue-collar workers. 
Much of  U.S. industry ultimately accepted the need to make radical shifts in 
methodology due to twin pressures-from  the showroom floors and, pertinent 
to this discussion, from institutional investors. From personal experience, I can 
4.  Lankes and Stern in chap. 2.1 note: “The impact of capital flows to [eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union] is of fundamental importance to the economic transition. These flows bring 
new methods of business organization, new technologies, and powerful influence on the building 
of financial, regulatory, and other institutions. They help establish the financial discipline that is 
crucial to the effective functioning of a market economy. Thus their impact goes far beyond the 
simple availability of resources.” 
5. I won’t enter a dog in the fight over the extent of  overall productivity improvement in the 
United States; however, clearly something of great value occurred when so many plants absorbed 
new work practices and-without  additional capital and with sharply reduced hours of worker 
input-turned  out markedly superior products. 296  Stephen Friedman 
testify that a similar transfer affecting work practices and productivity took 
place among British merchant bankers when U.S. investment banks set up 
“green-field plants” in the City of London that were (grudgingly) accepted as 
role models. 
Knowledge transfer now accompanies not only global direct investment and 
open trade but also US.-style portfolio investment: encouraging “best prac- 
tices” and-with  greater or less success in different emerging markets-trans- 
mitting a benign virus attacking many dysfunctional traditional overseas gov- 
ernmental and business patterns. Over the long term, and we all know how 
long that can be, the most productive ideas tend to win out-$(and  these are 
two big “if,”) markets and information flows make them accessible to potential 
adoptors and if  competitive pressures overcome resistance to change (i.e., if 
fear of the future exceeds the pain of change). 
So, I come to a question that has intrigued me for years: What are the “spill- 
over effects” and “social returns” to a nation from encouraging U.S .-style port- 
folio equity inflows-through  privatizing state-controlled corporations, pro- 
moting greater financial transparency, introducing more enlightened regulatory 
practices, and otherwise creating hospitable local equity markets? Can the so- 
cial returns to the recipient nation be estimated? Can we estimate the value to 
an economy of more efficient equity markets, in terms of increased domestic 
savings, and more efficient channeling of money to areas of high productivity 
and return? 
I will attempt to describe my perceptions as to some frequently overlapping, 
beneficial side effects of U.S. equity portfolio investment. (A caveat: develop- 
ing U.S.-style capital markets in emerging economies is a very uncertain and 
long-term process with some backsliding; my views are anecdotally based and 
lap over into the predictive-and,  perhaps even more suspect, into sociology!) 
An  increasingly vocal and influential, primarily ‘Anglo-Saxon,” interna- 
tional investor constituency has arisen-with  strong motives for encourag- 
ing positive change in the financial infrastructures and  corporate practices 
of emerging nations. Even to an amoral equity speculator, “an act which badly 
needs cleaning up” creates risks and systemic distortions harmful to present 
investment and future opportunities.  The “Washington consensus,”6  with the ad- 
dendum of a “Wall Street/City of London consensus,” as to desirable macro- and 
micropolicies for emerging economies and capital markets is increasingly be- 
ing accepted-at  least at the technocrat level-by  a new generation of highly 
educated (often in the United States) foreign government officials and private 
sector managers. Obviously, this acceptance has not occurred at some very 
important political and bureaucratic levels of certain emerging nation govern- 
6.  In remarks at the Roundtable on Financial Stability and Supervision in Emerging Markets 
(Hong Kong, September 1997), Jerry Comgan touched on key points related to the conference 
topic on which there is general consensus and points for which important gaps in information or 
understanding exist. 297  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
ments (viz. current events in Southeast Asia and the recent IMF meeting), nor 
is one detailed prescription appropriate for all patients. Nevertheless, there is 
a broadening global understanding that  autarky and bureaucratic allocation 
systems have failed to deliver growth and that many Western capitalistic norms 
must be embraced, including industrial competitiveness and open trade-and 
open capital markets. 
The Wall Street/City consensus assumes that an open, flexible, and transpar- 
ent equity market, and the financial and regulatory infrastructure underlying it, 
is a vital national asset for the United States and the United Kingdom and that 
its emulation in emerging nations would be a great boon to their own and the 
world‘s  prosperity. In contrast, many emerging markets are characterized by 
widespread corruption, insufficient regulation of the safety aspects of financial 
systems (contrasted with top-heavy bureaucratic meddling to enhance political 
power), inadequate protection of legal rights, insecure clearance and settlement 
systems, and cronyist concessions from influential politicians to  supporter^.^ 
There is a question of causation with respect to portfolio flows to emerging 
nations: emerging economies that better satisfy investor preferences are more 
likely to attract foreign capital, and those that do not meet those norms are 
unlikely to be large-scale recipients of flows. Which comes first, the money or 
the benign environment? I believe that what occurs is an iterative process in 
which adventurous “early adapter” speculators venture into a particular peril- 
ous emerging market when they perceive potential compensation in terms of 
extremely high returns; these investors then try to effect changes in the regula- 
tory and normative environment in order to make their present and potential 
investments safer and more attractive. To  the extent that they succeed, these 
speculative “pioneers” encourage other, less bold but still adventurous, “home- 
steaders” to speculate in equities in these emerging countries, with an attendant 
increase in the mass of  voices demanding conformity with desired norms. To 
the extent that they are enlightened, host nations have a mutual interest with 
investors in the adoption of  policies that reduce risk premiumss-and  their 
costs of capital-and  are associated with improved resource allocation, long- 
term growth, and competitiveness. 
In Russia this process is in its very early stages and is highly uncertain (a 
later stage of development is playing out behind the turmoil and highly con- 
frontational debates accompanying the recent IMF meetings in Asia). For ex- 
ample, in Russia today, early adapter equity investors are really on the frontier 
of the Wild East and must be corporate governance activists in order to protect 
their investments. Elementary protections-against  managements usurping 
corporate opportunities or flagrantly cheating minority shareholders or against 
7. Capital does not avoid risk per se-it  readily accepts it if the potential rewards are there and 
it believes it can assess the playing field and the odds-but  it generally avoids perils of an unfamil- 
iar nature, even if the ultimate amount of risk is no greater. 
8. According to Goldman Sachs research, a reduction in these risk premiums has been a key 
reason Latin America stocks have performed strongly in recent years. 298  Stephen Friedman 
fraud in share settlement and clearance systems-often  do not exist and must 
be put in place. 
A U.S. equity investment fund in Russia, in its own interest, may  expend 
money, experience, and energy to vindicate minority shareholder rights in  a 
merger, thereby setting a vital precedent for the embryonic commercial legal 
system; use its global relationships to seek a strategic foreign direct investment 
(FDI) partner for a portfolio company; and encourage local companies to use 
a Western custodian for their shares and to use a recognized accounting firm 
and accepted international auditing standards. As a spillover effect, in the fu- 
ture a state pension fund in the United States or a university endowment may, 
as a result of these efforts, be more likely to entrust its capital to a fund invest- 
ing in Russian equity. 
As another example, Indonesia also has a powerful incentive to listen to 
investors and take much needed steps to increase confidence. Thus, in a recent 
meeting cohosted by  an American investment bank, high-ranking Indonesian 
officials met with foreign equity managers “to try to persuade them that the 
country is on the right track” (WuU Street Journal, 10 October 1997). Clearly, 
the  international investors have  influence-they  vote with their feet-and 
strong motives to exert it.9 
Important emerging market privatizations are typically designed to encour- 
age local participation and develop habits of broader domestic equity owner- 
ship. Some privatizations, in Russia for example, have  been on concession- 
ary terms to powerful local barons. However, in most nations, the political and 
economic goal is to encourage the person on the street to begin investing and 
saving in equities, often a practice that is little understood. Western investment 
bankers and investors assist this process by  making knowledgeable demands 
for an increase in shareholder protections. They typically insist, as the price 
of  their participation-a  very valuable good housekeeping seal for an equity 
issuer-that  management evince a focus on creating value for all shareholders, 
rather than propping up weak entities for local political purposes or feathering 
managers’ personal nests. These concepts, alien to many economies, are borne 
on the currents of open market capitalism and are contagious.1° 
Not only should investor-friendly equity markets be a magnet for increased 
domestic savings (which, outside of  Asia, is a potential Achilles’ heel for 
9. Samuelson and Nordhaus (1986) in discussing the massive capital flows of the Pax Britannica 
period before World War I, including the “transfer [of] capital from place to place at [the] slightest 
whim,” note that “those nationalistic countries which questioned private property were intimidated 
by a show of battleships or an army battalion.” Today, equity markets, along with the bond and 
currency markets and FDI  flows have these in terrorern effects. (Even in the United States, markets 
intimidate: note James Camille’s hope to be reincarnated as the bond market “because everyone is 
scared to death of it.”) 
10. “Chinese officials hope that over the long run, releasing state companies into the free market 
will force a natural selection of viable businesses. ‘We must have a system where the strong survive 
and the weak fail,’ said China’s Minister of the State Economic and Trade Commission, during a 
recent party Congress: ‘That is the lesson of the market economy’” (New  York Times, 5 October 
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emerging nations), but educating the public and giving them reason to be more 
comfortable with equity investment promises to allocate and channel savings 
more efficiently to the most productive and highest return investments.” Thus 
the ability of equity flows to develop an infrastructure and template for domes- 
tic equity investment-and  provide a trusted imprimatur to well-run local cor- 
porations-is  likely to be more important than the actual amount of U.S.  dol- 
lar inflows into emerging markets. These inflows, while welcome, are modest 
compared to domestic savings. Thus, for example, in Latin America, there has 
been an explosion in private pension funds, which now  manage about $130 
billion, growing by about $1 billion a month. ‘‘Assets that once languished in 
inefficiently managed government pension plans are being channeled to asset 
management firms, whose holdings include a growing share of local stock . . . 
markets.” The portion of Latin American equity deals, often led by Wall Street 
firms, that is sold locally, which averaged 10 to  15 percent a year ago, has 
grown to 20 to 30 percent of many issues, and in some cases all the equity can 
now be raised in the local markets. To the extent that Western investors are able 
to make the Russian stock market safer for minority shareholders, Russians- 
cynical observers of  abuses in early privatizations-are  more likely to take 
money from under their mattresses and buy equities. This will provide desper- 
ately needed working capital to domestic corporations and encourage the flow 
back to Russia of some of the immense amounts of earlier capital outflow. 
More emerging nation domestic venture capitalists and risk-tolerant inves- 
tors will emerge and invest in start-ups and high-growth young companies if 
maturing, vital domestic stock markets promise liquidity and  exits. Mean- 
while, U.S. venture capitalists and merchant bankers and some elite, domes- 
tic specialists in the emerging nations are investing aggressively in private, 
liquidity-short, high-growth ventures in these nations, often counting on a 
“takeout” down the road with a U.S.-led initial public offering (IPO). 
With open equity markets, the opportunities for management measurement 
and benchmarking are dramatically enhanced; competition for capital and in- 
vestor approbation “concentrates the mind wonderfully.” With Anglo-Saxon 
equity flows come Anglo-Saxon-style money managers, security analysts, and 
investment bankers.I2  Newly privatized and other emerging market public com- 
panies now have  public financial reports that can be compared to those of 
competitors or other industry participants across national boundaries, and vo- 
luminous analysts’ reports abound with every conceivable comparative metric. 
Senior executives are anxious to tap into the information flow and learn what 
their domestic and international competitors are doing, not only from their 
11. Outside the emerging markets, this process is already at work in western Europe. An im- 
mense volume of  forthcoming telecommunications  and vital infrastructure privatizations over- 
hangs the market, and investment bankers count on the buying power of a relatively new class of 
domestic equity investors. 
12. Whose incoming fees are a useful addition to U.S. “service” trade flows and whose advice 
is-arguably-a  useful export! 300  Stephen Friedman 
subordinates-according  to whatever particular agendas they have-but  in 
private meetings or investor conferences with security analysts, money manag- 
ers, and investment bankers. Good and bad performance is highlighted. Man- 
agements feel increased pressure to improve and to perform for stockholders- 
a focus that had rarely been their experience before-pressure  to get a higher 
return on assets, to make their businesses more efficient, and to reduce redun- 
dant employment, rather than to be a source of politically convenient jobs.  l3 
Emerging nation equity market leaders recognize the need for security reform, 
improved settlement procedures, and more transparent accounting standards if 
their companies are to compete for much needed equity inflows. The financial 
industry trade press is replete with stories underscoring this point. For ex- 
ample, an article entitled “Market Reform: The Promise of Liquidity,” in World 
Equity magazine, reports on how Middle Eastern regulatory authorities are 
assiduously responding to the specific criticisms of specialist equity managers 
(often U.S. and U.K. emerging market fund managers) to reform their markets, 
in order to be competitive in capital markets. This is a mentoring effect, similar 
to that from FDI. 
Good security and country analysts provide much the same benefit as a free 
press, exposing obfuscation and cover-ups-generally  with much greater in- 
sight. There is a growing watchdog effect in many emerging markets (though 
obviously, as  indicated by  recent  events, often still without sharp enough 
teeth!). Road shows and meetings with analysts and money managers do not 
respect the cultures and motives of family conglomerate empires or statist cor- 
porations. A publicly traded industrial company that might wish to use its cash 
or borrowing capacity to speculate in real estate, or to accumulate ill-fitting 
subsidiaries for reasons of  domestic power and prestige, will find it difficult 
over time to rationalize such decisions in a return-driven environment with 
more checks and balances. Appointments of  senior bureaucrats, whose prin- 
cipal qualification is loyalty to those in power, to run key state-controlled pub- 
lic companies as a form of patronage and to ensure that politically acceptable 
people control assets will become more difficult to carry off. Unsavory prac- 
tices-for  example, family groups shifting funds from public vehicles they 
control to private vehicles they own outright-are  more likely to be ferreted 
out, leading to less wasteful, less corrupt uses of capital. The use of  political 
pressure to intimidate nominally private banks into funding politically moti- 
vated but economically unsound projects, or politically favored businessmen, 
will become less likely in such an environment, if markets send loud negative 
signals. This process is under way,  albeit embryonically, in many emerging 
markets. However, as recent events in Southeast Asia make abundantly clear, 
steps to date in this direction have been inadequate. 
With access to U.S. equity investors, and the more attractive financing this 
makes possible, privatized and newly public emerging market corporations 
13. This, and numerous other insights in this paper, stem from the “firing line” experience of 
Mark Evans, co-chief executive of Goldman, Sachs’s global equity capital markets thrust. 301  The Role of Equity Markets in International Capital Flows 
now have the currency to make sizable acquisitions. Stock prices permitting, 
they are likely to be participants in merger markets, leading to useful cross- 
fertilization and transactions and building economies of scale.I4 
I will now attempt to identify some very conceptual, fundamental cultural ex- 
ternalities that I believe will accompany U.S. portfolio equity investment over 
time in those emerging markets where the soil is ripe for entrepreneurialism. 
This is “soft stuff,” but more and more smart managers understand that “culture 
is destiny.” In my perception, culture is far more important in national and cor- 
porate development than differences in hard assets. So I’m going to dwell on 
this point.15 
It’s now axiomatic that-in  an ever faster, more volatile, and more global 
world-economic  success depends heavily on innovation and ready adapta- 
bility. Success goes to corporate cultures that strive to be in the information 
flows-the  markets for new ideas-and  that are more entrepreneurial and less 
hierarchical, embody the concept of constant improvement, are willing to can- 
nibalize their own product lines and shelve past practices (a big psychological 
barrier), break down interior functional walls and inculcate greater interdisci- 
plinary cooperation into their workforces (another major resistance point), and 
achieve greater fluidity in forming interfirm partnerships (to augment their own 
comparative advantages). Accompanying  these norms  should be an  attitude 
more open to bold experiment-with  the attendant risk of failure. (These atti- 
tudes are generally far better accepted and understood in the United States than 
in western Europe or Japan.) Underlying all of these cultural attitudes is the 
assumption that the greater short-term financial and career risks inherent in 
these approaches demand greater financial carrots. In other words, the successful 
risk taker deserves to get his or her financial head well above the crowd (which 
is not a very continental European, Japanese, or British approach, in general). 
As another way of saying it: success in a world of global information revolu- 
tion requires organizations that function as complex adaptive systems-in  the 
Santa Fe Institute sense-highly  motivated, regularly evolving human ecosys- 
tems, composed of constantly interacting, self-directing units-that  come to- 
gether in varying unit configurations to better adjust to changing environments. 
In Darwin’s world, it helps a lot to be strong, swift, and smart, but survival- 
14. E.g., Mexico’s poultry leader, facing increased competition from US.  firms, launched a U.S. 
IPO, the proceeds of which were in part intended to finance acquisitions to afford economies of 
scale (WaZZ  Street Journal,  19 September 1997). Similarly, a major Argentine retailer, which re- 
ceived much of its early support from U.S. brokers rather than Argentine investors, went public in 
April  1Y96 and obtained capital to make consolidating acquisitions in the Latin American retail 
area, which faces increased competition from major global firms. 
15. A parable teaches that “if you give a man a fish you feed him for a day, but if you teach him 
to fish you feed him for a lifetime,” That, in a way, is what happens when a transfer of specific 
technical knowledge accompanies FDI.  However-to  beat the parable to death-I  would argue 
that inculcating a US.-style capitalistic equity market orientation into emerging markets provides 
the infrastructure, incentive, and orientation for local entrepreneurial managers to work out for 
themselves new and better ways of fishing, perhaps even leapfrogging FDI patrons. No one has 
ever figured out a better framework for encouraging the “invisible hand.” 302  Stephen Friedman 
and being a beneficiary and not a victim of “creative destruction”-ultimately 
depends on being adaptive.I6 
Sound “touchy-feely”? To me, it distinguishes the economic winners from 
the losers. I am suggesting a vision in which Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and 
Intel are epitomes of adaptive cultural success in our economic environment- 
for the present at least! (Also,  take a look behind the glossy facades of success- 
ful U.S. investment banks. If they didn’t behave as complex adaptive systems, 
they couldn’t compete.) Economic institutions such as these place exceptional 
demands on their employees and cannot thrive without the lure of exceptional 
financial rewards to attract extraordinary effort from top talent.  l7 
In the earlier industrial revolutions of steam machinery and electricity, great 
risk  takers  and entrepreneurs performed epic feats, built highly  successful 
companies for the era, and were lavishly rewarded. In the current era, if one 
accepts what I’ve suggested are the attributes necessary for success-for  ex- 
ample, flatter hierarchies and operations dependent on the initiative of larger 
numbers of motivated people-reward  systems must reach further down into 
organizations. And-of  immense importance-the  reward system must align 
key employees’ incentives with the stated goals of  the enterprise (otherwise 
employees will tend consciously or unconsciously to game the system). Noth- 
ing achieves this goal better than employee ownership of stock and US.-style 
stock options (which, until recently, were not even legal in some major indus- 
trial nations). Anyone who spends time in the fastest paced and most vibrant 
parts of our economy’*  would be struck by the driving psychological force for 
employees of an ownership stake.19 
The United States is particularly hospitable to entrepreneurial environments 
16. One of the country’s leading lawyers, whose practice deals with titanic corporate struggles, 
cites the Forbes 400 as a research tool for understanding the changing U.S. economy and the “new 
breed” of business leaders in the information age. 
17. Such corporate successes constantly help to spawn even more entrepreneurial progeny. In- 
deed, just as Wall Street, Hollywood, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and Toledo early became nests 
for fledgling finance, motion picture, steel, auto, meat packing, and tire companies, complex adap- 
tive systems ready to deal with the challenges of the twenty-first century have sprung up in Silicon 
Valley, Austin, Seattle, Route 128, the Research Triangle, and San Diego. 
18. E.g., the Internet; computer and biotech start-ups; fledgling companies in retail and service 
industries; “consolidations” seeking efficiencies through “roll-ups” of existing businesses; soft- 
ware companies developing solutions to dramatically enhance supply chain productivity, factory 
and warehouse efficiency, and targeted marketing strategies; new and more efficient health care 
ventures. 
19. In one sense, this is just a modem-day example of the “invisible hand’ at work, but in 
another sense, modem US.-style capitalism, replete with the holy grails of equity ownership- 
IPOs, stock options, etc.-provides  the same attraction to highly energetic, talented people that 
administering Her Majesty’s empire might have had in a prior century or workmg in FDR’s New 
Deal earlier in ow own. Of  great importance is the fact that these entrepreneurial and wealth- 
creating U.S. environments also attract great talent from abroad, often from emerging nations-a 
form of  mercantilism in which the United States imports great brains and exports high-value- 
added, sophisticated high-tech products, often software. Clearly, this phenomenon is hyped by an 
aggressive bull market, and a major downturn will bring substantial morale problems, but equity 
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and attitudes-a  major advantage of  the U.S. economy as we  approach the 
twenty-first century. Such environments can no more be manufactured whole 
than the Amazon rain forest. However, with patience, incentives, and conscious 
transplanting of seeds, such environments can take root in some emerging mar- 
kets. (In its own way, Hong Kong is very much the sort of environment I’ve de- 
scribed.) However, it would be a great aid to have U.S.-style equity markets 
to lure risk capital funders and to provide incentives to entrepreneurs (these 
incentives are delicately called “liquidity events”). (Certainly, this variable is 
insufficient in itself-silicon  Valley required much more than stock options in 
order to evolve as an archetype of such an environment.) 
In many emerging nations, there will continue to be resistance from established 
political forces that want the capital that comes with FDI and portfolio invest- 
ment, as well as the politically unthreatening, economy-boosting technological 
improvements that accompany it, but are uncomfortable with the gradual cul- 
tural changes, emerging entrepreneurial classes, and reduced governmental con- 
trol that are likely to follow from U.S.-style  equity markets. However, I’m 
betting that, over time, an idea that delivers demonstrable value will prevail. 
4. George N. Hatsopoulos 
I am going to say a few words about the mirror image of what was addressed 
by Stephen Friedman, namely, equity flows to the United States, which by  all 
measures have been small. I have added them up over the past five years, over 
$45 billion, so they’re not much compared to the size of the U.S. economy. But 
they have played a very important role in the development of Thermo Electron. 
In general, much of the equity flow to the United States is the result of equity 
offerings that U.S. companies make in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in Asia. 
This activity usually takes place when the companies intend to raise capital. 
U.S.  corporations want to enlarge their investor base, so they go to Europe or 
other parts of the world where investment funds are available. 
Our company completed a large number of public offerings over the past 
five years. In total, we raised about $3 billion, of  which 40 percent was  in 
straight equity, and the remainder was  kind of  a hybrid of  equity and debt 
known as convertible debenture. Another aspect of this aggregate is that about 
half the money was raised in Europe and half in the United States. That ratio 
is quite unusual. It’s not accidental; it’s very deliberate. We  decided to raise 
only half of  new equity or new subordinated debt in the United States, and 
the rest abroad. I would like to explain why Thermo Electron has followed 
this practice. 
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corporate structure that has become known as the “spinout” structure. Pursuant 
to this effort, we incorporated virtually all of our distinctive business activities 
into subsidiaries and allowed each to raise the funds it might need from exter- 
nal equity markets, with the provision that each of these subsidiaries abide by 
the rules outlined in what we call the Thermo Electron corporate charter. The 
principal reason for introducing this spinout structure is to provide the manage- 
ment incentives addressed by Friedman, namely, some ownership in their own 
business by  way  of stock options and the responsibility of running their own 
company. Sometimes Thermo Electron owns as much as 90 percent of these 
spinouts, and although some spinouts are owned by the parent at a lower per- 
centage, it is always a controlling percentage. The second reason for this struc- 
ture is that we have been able to raise money at lower capital cost than if we 
were to raise it by  selling shares of the parent company. Thermo Electron has 
always had a favorable price-to-earnings (PE)  ratio, between 20 and 30, which 
has usually been rather comfortable for raising equity capital-but  not nearly 
as comfortable as raising capital with an infinite PE ratio, which many of  our 
subsidiaries have. 
Let me now come to the reasons why we are intending to raise only half the 
capital in the United States. The first reason is that, when we started to examine 
the European market about twenty-seven years ago, especially in developed 
economies such as the United Kingdom, West Germany, Switzerland, France, 
and more recently Italy and Greece, we found we would be dealing with inves- 
tors who in general have much longer investment horizons than do Americans. 
That is quite important to us because of our longterm goals and strategies. The 
second characteristic of Europeans is their much longer institutional memory. 
Right now, for instance, we know the people in maybe a dozen banks in Zurich. 
We  know individuals in each of the banks who invested in our company back 
in 1971. This wouldn’t be possible with American institutions. For a company 
like us, this characteristic is very important. The third aspect is that Europeans, 
and Asians as well, value safety more than high returns. This attribute suits us 
very well. For instance, for a subordinated debenture, American investors re- 
quire a pretty high coupon. Of course, they give you  an equivalent premium. 
But if we go to Europe and tell them, “We’ll give you a lower conversion pre- 
mium, but we want to pay only 3 percent,” they will take it. This is much better 
for us because we know they’re going to convert anyway, so why pay the higher 
interest rate? 
What happens, incidentally, is that by starting the process in Europe to raise 
half the capital, we force the other half, which is in the United States, to buy 
the terms that we  have negotiated in Europe. That has worked enormously 
well. We’ll never go the other way around. If we start in the United States, ne- 
gotiating with major institutions, we’re going to get less desirable terms. So 
we start negotiating in Europe, where there is in each institution at least one 
person who has known us for a long time. 
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Discussion Summary 
Linda  Tesar noted that approximately 10 to  12 percent of  the current U.S. 
portfolio of stocks is invested abroad. While this figure corresponds to recent 
large equity outflows, these figures remain relatively small from the perspec- 
tive of the long-run diversification benefits afforded by investing abroad. Tesar 
noted that this increased diversification has the potential to lead to contagion 
as losses may  be more easily transmitted across markets. Finally, she com- 
mented that it was extremely difficult to isolate contagion empirically. 
Stephen Friedman responded that institutional investors differ in their appe- 
tite for international exposure, with some seeking to allocate 20 percent of 
their portfolios abroad. He also noted that contagions and crises, by definition, 
involve greatly shaken confidence concerning the stricken market. For this and 
other reasons, he was highly doubtful about the creation of a private insurance 
fund to cover the risk of currency crises, as had been suggested by one of the 
participants. These crises are typically characterized by overshooting and enor- 
mous emotionality, requiring early returning participants to the market to be 
confident bargain hunters. Finally, Friedman noted, markets can correct them- 
selves relatively quickly as investors regain confidence. 
Friedman speculated that the turnover rates of  U.S. institutional investors 
are somewhat higher than in other countries. He noted that bankers can tailor 
offerings in a great variety of  ways  to satisfy the requirements of  different 
issuers. George Hatsopoulos responded that the difference between the hori- 
zons of  U.S. investors and European investors is small but perceptible. He 
noted that Thermo Electron had chosen a 5060  mix between U.S. and Euro- 
pean investors and found that mix to be optimal. Finally, Hatsopoulos com- 
mented that the spinout strategy employed by Thermo Electron is becoming a 
model for other firms. Other firms, however, are more sensitive to the disad- 
vantages of  such a strategy, particularly the greater transparency of  such a 
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